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THE SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR
COMPUTER PROGRAMS: EXPLORING THE IDEA/
EXPRESSION DICHOTOMY*
The piracy of computer software' is a major problem in the computer
industry and costs the industry billions of dollars in lost revenues. 2 Com-
mercial software developers ordinarily invest millions of dollars to create
* A version of this article was submitted in the Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition.
1. See Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (codified
at 17 U.S.C. § 101, 117 (1982)). The 1980 amendment to § 101 of the 1976 Copyright Act defines
a computer program as a series of direct or indirect instructions designed for use in a computer
to bring about a certain result. Id. § 101. Courts often use the term "software" interchangeably
with the term "computer program." See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,
714 F.2d 1240, 1242 (3d Cir. 1983) (using term "software" interchangeably with term "computer
program"), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); Centurion Indus., Inc. v. Warren Steurer &
Assoc., 665 F.2d 323, 324 (10th Cir. 1981) (describing computer programs created by user to
perform desired result as "software"); District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Assoc., 465
F.2d 615, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (referring to computer programs stored on punched cards as
software). The term "software," however, also may include the user manuals, program listings
and documentation, libraries of program segments known as subroutines, and program speci-
fications as well as the program. BURTON, A DICTIONARY OF MICROCOMPUTING 144 (1976).
Software may encompass anything that is not hardware or firmware. Id. Furthermore, software
often refers to a particular genus of computer programs. For example, systems software is the
genus of programs that control the activities of the computer and allows the computer to
control and coordinate the function of other hardware. Id. Applications software is the genus
of computer programs that perform a particular function, like word processing. Id.
Hardware refers to the physical machinery including the computer, printer, and various
other devices for the output, input, and storage of information. See Response of Carolina, Inc.
v. Leaseco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1326 (1976) (defining hardware as actual physical
machinery that consists of discrete parts including the central processing unit (CPU), electronic
device that performs arithmetic and logical operations, and various devices for storing and
retrieving data); Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1979)
(defining hardware as computer, printer, collator, and related equipment). Firmware describes
computer programs stored in Read Only Memory (ROM). THE McGR.w-HIu. COMPUTER HAND-
BOOK G-4 (H. Helms ed. 1983); see infra note 54 and accompanying text (explaining Read Only
Memory).
2. See Justice Department Okays Promulgation of Industry Standards for Computer
Software Protection System, [Jan.-June] ANTrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 5, at A-7
(Jan. 8, 1986) [hereinafter cited as Industry Standards For Computer Software Protection]. In
a business review letter dated January 6, 1986 Assistant Attorney General Douglas Ginsburg
stated that unauthorized copying of computer software is a serious economic problem for the
computer software industry. Id. See Thou Shalt Not Dupe, COMPUTERWORLD, Jan. 28, 1985,
at ID/1-ID/2 (software piracy is severe problem in computer software industry). The Association
of Data Processing Service, Organizations, Inc. (ADAPSO) recently conducted a study which
indicated that the unauthorized copying of computer software has cost the industry $1.3 billion
between 1981 and 1984. Industry Standards For Computer Software Protection, supra, at A-7.
Both forms of unauthorized copying, piracy and illicit copying, are serious problems in the
computer industry. BORKINO, THIRD PARTY PROTECTION OF SOFTWARE AND FIRMWARE 408-13
(1985). Piracy is the commercial exploitation of another's software while illicit copying involves
the unauthorized copying of computer software for personal use. Id. Both forms of unauthorized
copying infringe the exclusive rights of the copyright owner to make copies. See 17 U.S.C. §
106 (1982) (copyright owner has exclusive right to make copies of copyrighted works).
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and market successful new computer programs.3 Accordingly, legal protection
of software is essential for the computer industry to thwart software piracy
and insure software developers' monetary incentives.4 Many software devel-
opers rely on copyright protection as the most accessible form of legal
protection because of the limited availability of other forms of legal protec-
tion for software.5 The 6xtent to which copyright law protects more than the
3. See Software: The New Driving Force, Bus. WK., Feb. 27, 1984, at 77. The estimated
average cost of developing and marketing a new microcomputer program is eight million dollars.
Id. Presumably, the cost of developing a longer, more complex program for a mainframe
computer is in excess of eight million dollars. Brief of Amicus Curiae at 3, Whelan Assoc., Inc.
v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
4. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 783 (C.D. Cal.
1983), aff'd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984). Few companies will invest the time and capital
necessary to develop new productivity-enhancing programs if other companies can appropriate
their products. Id.; see FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 11 (1978) (legal and physical protection of computer programs
is necessary for future creation and dissemination of programs) [hereinafter cited as CONTU
FINAL REPORT].
5. See CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 16-18 (comparing copyright with other
forms of legal protection for computer software). Several forms of legal protection are available
to the developers of computer software, including copyright protection, patent protection, trade
secrecy protection, and protection from unfair competition. Id. at 16-19.
Patents provide a monopoly to inventors for any "new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement." See 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1982). A valid patent-gives the owner the exclusive right to use, make, or sell the patented
invention. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271(a) (1982). See generally Conley and Bryan, A Unifying
Theory for the Litigation of Computer Software Copyright Cases, 63 N.C.L. REv. 563, 569
(1985) (discussing patent protection for computer software); Stout, Protection of Programming
in the Aftermath of Diamond v. Diehr, COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL, Vol. IV, 207, 208 (1983)
(same). Although the Supreme Court in Diamond v. Diehr held that a computer program may
be the proper subject matter for patent protection in limited circumstances, patents are difficult
to obtain for computer programs. See INTERNATIONAL BUREAU OF THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, MODEL PROVISIONS ON Tm PROTECTION OF COMPUTER SoFTrwAE 4
(1978) (discussing difficulty of obtaining patents for computer programs); see Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). Obtaining a patent can take at least two years and can cost
several thousand dollars. Stout, supra, at 208. Patent protection is, therefore, not feasible for
some programs because the commercial life-cycle of some programs is shorter than the time
necessary to obtain the patent. A. GEMIGNANi, LAW AND THE COMPUTER 100, 107 (1981).
Although trade secrecy is one form of protection relied upon by the computer industry,
problems exist with trade secrecy protection, especially with mass marketed software. GEmiG-
NANI, supra, at 113. Trade secrecy protects formulas, patterns, devices, or compilations of
information that a business uses to gain an advantage over competitors who do not have the
secret. RESTATE ENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939). The Restatement of Torts suggests
several elements to consider when deciding whether certain information is a trade secret. Id.
§ 757. These considerations include the extent to which persons outside the business know the
secret, whether employees of the business know the secret, the degree of care the business has
taken to protect the secret, the value of the secret to the business and its competitors, the cost
of developing the secret, and the ease or difficulty with which others can duplicate or acquire
the secret. Id. To meet the secrecy requirement of a trade secret, a business does not have to
maintain absolute secrecy, but can disclose to others in confidence under an express or implied
agreement not to disclose the agreement. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475
(1974). An obvious tension exists between maintaining secrecy and marketing programs for wide
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literal instructions (code) of a program, however, is uncertain, and software
developers presently cannot rely on copyright protection alone.6 Greater
certainty in the scope of copyright protection for computer programs is
necessary to promote the continued growth of the software industry.7
Much uncertainty surrounding the legal protection for computer pro-
grams is a result of the fundamental copyright principle that copyright law
protects only the expression of an idea, and not the underlying idea itself.
8
distribution. Conley & Bryan, supra, at 576. Nevertheless, the wide distribution of software
alone does not prohibit trade secrecy protection. 1d. The developer, however, can preserve the
trade secrecy by distributing the programs pursuant to a nondisclosure agreement that creates
a confidential relationship between the developer and the licensee. Id.; see J & K Computer
System, Inc. v. Parrish, 642 P.2d 732, 735 (Utah 1982) (finding that developer had preserved
trade secrecy protection by informing employees and customers that program was secret, and
by placing notice on each copy of program restricting program's use to authorized licensees).
In addition to the difficulty in maintaining the secrecy of widely distributed software, uncertainty
exists concerning the extent of trade secrecy protection and the remedies available for misap-
propriation. See Conley & Bryan, supra, at 576-78 (discussing problems with protection of
computer software through trade secrecy); GEMIGNANI, supra, at 113 (same). For example, trade
secrecy does not offer protection against independent creation or reverse engineering-the
method of starting with a particular result and working backwards to ascertain the process that
created the result. Kewanee, 470 U.S. at 476.
An alternative form of protection for software is the common-law doctrine of unfair
competition. See CONTU FINAL. REPORT, supra note 4, at 18. Unfair competition protects
against the misappropriation of a competitor's skill, investments, and labor. Id. The unfair
competition doctrine prohibits the counterfeiting or "passing off" of another's work. Id. In
certain situations, the doctrine of unfair competition can provide ancillary support to copyright
protection. Id. The doctrine, however, has a limited scope of protection and probably cannot
provide sufficient protection alone for computer programs. Id.
Finally, many software developers are turning to contract law to protect their rights in
software through license agreements. See Note, The Protection of Computer Software Through
Shrink-Wrap License Agreements, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1349-50 (1985) (by using
license agreements developer can limit users' rights to copy, transfer, and modify software and
thereby acquire greater legal protection than by using traditional methods alone).
6. See Note, supra note 5, at 1356 (scope of protection provided by copyright is uncertain
and industry cannot rely on copyright alone to prevent piracy). Many software developers do
not trust the protection provided by copyright law and apparently cannot depend on copyright
law to protect their computer programs because of unresolved issues regarding protection of
computer programs. BORKING, supra note 2, at 253; see Ranney, Copyright Law Could Threaten
Software Mimics, INFOWORLD, Dec. 2, 1985, at 1, 8 (software developers do not know how
closely one program can resemble another program without infringing copyright); infra notes
7-10 and accompanying text (discussing uncertainty in copyright protection of computer soft-
ware).
7. See RANNEY, supra note 6, at 8 (software developers need greater certainty in scope
of protection provided by copyright law); supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing need
for software protection to provide software developers with sufficient monetary incentives to
create new software).
8. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982). Copyright law does not protect any idea, process, or
method of operation. Id.; see H.R. REp. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1976), reprinted
in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5670 (section 102(b) provides that only expression
of idea is copyrightable) [hereinafter cited as 1976 REPORT]; infra note 24 and accompanying
text (discussing fundamental copyright principle that copyright law protects expression of idea
only).
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The boundary between protectible expression and the underlying idea or pro-
cess in computer programs is particularly difficult to determine.9 In distin-
guishing between the idea and the expression in a computer program, courts
and commentators have recognized that limiting copyright protection only
to the programming code in a computer program will not insure proper
monetary incentives for program developers. 0 Consequently, courts have
begun to protect additional elements in computer programs such as the
structure and organization of programs." Although courts recently have begun
to address the issue of protectible expression in computer programs, the scope
of protection for computer programs remains undetermined.
2
The policies underlying the federal copyright law are instructive for
determining the proper scope of protection for computer programs. The
copyright clause of the United States Constitution authorizes Congress to
protect the "writings" of "authors" to promote the advancement of science
9. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 22; see Universal Athletic Sales Co. v.
Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir.) (no principle can determine when imitator has gone beyond
'idea' and borrowed 'expression'), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975); infra notes 46-50 and
accompanying text (discussing difficulties in distinguishing idea from expression in computer
software).
10. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 783 (C.D. Cal.
1983), aff'd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984) (software companies will not invest capital and
resources if people can freely duplicate their programs). Because the coding level of creating a
program only represents 20% of a new program's total development cost, few companies will
invest the time and resources necessary to create new programs when their competitors freely
can pirate eighty percent of the investment. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, at 6, Whelan Assoc.
Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986) (limiting copyright protec-
tion to literal text of computer programs would seriously harm software industry and impair
software industry's contributions to economy and nation); FRANiK, CRITICALs IS IN SOFrwARE,
20-24 (1983) (actual coding represents only 20% of development cost of software). If legal protec-
tion of computer software is inadequate, those companies that did decide to develop new programs
would have to charge exorbitant prices to recoup their investments. See CONTU FINAL REPORT,
supra note 4, at 11 (without adequate protection of software, developers would have to recoup
their investment by charging exorbitant prices on first sales of software).
The most important intellectual labors of a programmer are in creating the design,
structure, and organization of a program. Brief of Amicus Curiae, at 10, Whelan Assoc. Inc.
v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986). A programmer creates works
of authorship at every stage in the development of a computer program. Id. The programmer
constantly refines each step into successively more detailed steps. Id. at 9. The final stage of
the program, translating a detailed expression or description of the steps necessary to achieve
the desired result into source code, does not require as much creativity as the earlier stages of
software development because the coder must preserve the expression embodied in the program's
development stages. Id. at 10. Protection of the authorship involved in the earlier stages of pro-
gramming, therefore, is necessary to insure adequate incentives for computer programmers. Id.
at 13.
11. See infra notes 77-140, 164-67 and accompanying text (discussing cases that extend
copyright protection of computer software to structure and organization of program).
12. See infra notes 77-140, 164-67 and accompanying text (discussing cases that extend
copyright protection to computer program's structure and organization).
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and the arts."3 To achieve the objective of promoting science and the arts,
the United States Constitution gives Congress the power to reward authors
through exclusive control over the right to make and sell copies of the
authors' works, thereby encouraging people to dedicate themselves to intel-
lectual and artistic creation.' 4 Copyright law, consequently, serves two inher-
ently competing interests: rewarding individual's creative efforts as an incentive
for creating useful programs and protecting the free dissemination of ideas
for the public's benefit.' 5
Historically, federal copyright law has expanded to protect novel forms
of expression made possible by the creation of new technologies.' 6 By 1976,
13. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The copyright clause states in pertinent part:
The Congress shall have Power ... [8] To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;
Id. The objective of the copyright clause is to promote the advancement of science and art. See
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973). In Goldstein, the Supreme Court defined the
constitutional meaning of "author" as the person to whom a work owes its origin. Id. The
Supreme Court defined the constitutional meaning of "writing" to include "any physical
rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthietic labor." Id.
14. U.S. CoNrsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973)
(Constitution gives Congress power to reward authors and inventors by granting them control
over sale or commercial use of copies of their works).
15. See Whelan Assoc., Inc v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1235 (3d
Cir. 1986) (purpose of copyright law is to create most productive balance between incentive and
dissemination of information); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's
Corporation, 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977) (copyright law attempts to reconcile two com-
peting social interests: rewarding individuals creativity and effort while permitting nation to benefit
from use of same subject matter).
16. Id. at 562. Congress historically has decided which works of authorship to protect
under federal copyright law by considering both the character of the "writing" and the
commercial importance of the product to the national economy. Id. In 1790 Congress passed
the Act of May 31, 1790, the first copyright statute, which protected maps, charts, and books.
Act of May 31, 1790, c. 15, 1 Stat. 124. Since 1790, however, Congress has expanded copyright
law to protect the many new forms of expression. See Act of Apr. 29, 1802, c. 36, 2 Stat. 171.
Congress amended the 1790 Act in 1802 to protect any historical or other prints. Id. Congress
extended protection to musical compositions in 1831. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, c. 16, 4 Stat. 436.
When Matthew Brady's pictures of the Civil War began attaining fame in 1865, Congress added
protection for photographs and photographic negatives. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, c. 126, 13 Stat.
540. In 1870 Congress extended protection for paintings, drawings, chromos, statuettes, statuary,
and models or designs of fine art. Act of July 8, 1870, c. 230, 16 Stat. 198. See also Goldstein,
412 U.S. at 562 (discussing history of copyright statutes). In response to the enormous increase
in various kinds of expression needing protection under federal copyright law, Congress passed
the Copyright Act of 1909, which consolidated and amended the existing federal copyright
statute. Copyright Act of 1909 (1909 Act), Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075. See H.R. REP.
No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1909) (enormous increase in copying of works of authorship
not subject to prior protection under prior copyright acts necessitated revision in copyright
law). Since 1909, the creation of new technologies has provided authors with novel forms of
expressing themselves that often have created difficult issues about the protection of these new
works of authorship. Copyright law has struggled to accommodate the new forms of expression.
See CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 3 (noting that some people have questioned
adequacy of legal structure to cope with pace and technological change in copyrightable works).
In 1912 Congress expanded the 1909 Act to include specifically motion pictures, reasoning that
the property rights and money invested in motion pictures had become so valuable that copyright
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the tremendous growth in technology required a major revision of the
copyright laws,' 7 and Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1976" ('76
Act). The '76 Act protects "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression, now known or later developed. . . ."" The '76 Act
retained two basic requirements of copyright protection: originality and
fixation in a tangible form.2 In the '76 Act, Congress expanded the fixation
requirement to encompass works fixed in any medium capable of commu-
nicating the work either directly or through the assistance of a machine.
2'
The '76 Act enumerates two categories of copyrightable works of authorship
that have been applied respectively to computer programs and their visual
screens: literary works; and motion pictures and other audiovisual works.
22
In section 102(b) of the '76 Act, Congress codified the fundamental
copyright principle established by the Supreme Court in Baker v. Selden,
2
1
law should protect motion pictures. Act of August 24, 1912, c. 566, 37 Stat. 488. The increase
in the piracy of sound recordings, which was partially due to technological advances in recording
equipment, forced Congress in 1971 to amend the 1909 Act to specifically include sound
recordings. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391.
17. See CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 3. The technology explosion left Congress
and those affected by the copyright laws dissatisfied with the copyright law under the Copyright
Act of 1909. Id. The general belief was that a major revision of the copyright law, rather than
piecemeal amendments to the 1909 Act, was necessary. Id.; KITCH & PERLMAN, LEGAL REGU-
LATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCEss 622-23 (1979) ('76 Act altered fundamental structure of
American copyright law).
18. Copyright Act of 1976 ('76 Act) §§ 101-810, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982).
19. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
20. Id.
21. Id; see 1976 REPORT, supra note 8, at 5665 (overruling White-Smith Publishing Co.
v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908)). The United States Supreme Court in White-Smith Publishing
Co. v. Apollo Co. held that the piano roll for a player piano was not a copy of the musical
composition embedded on the roll because the music was not in a form that humans could see
and read. While-Smith Publishing Co., 209 U.S. at 18. In contrast, the '76 Act does not
require that a work be directly perceivable by humans. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). The
'76 Act only requires that a work be "fixed" in a medium that can reproduce the work
directly or with the assistance of a device or machine. Id. For example, a program in the
volatile memory of a computer that disappears when the programmer turns off the computer
is not "fixed" within the meaning of the '76 Act. See 1976 REPORT, supra note 8, at 5666 (term
"fixed" excludes reproductions momentarily stored in "memory" of computer). If, however,
the programmer stores the program onto an electromagnetic tape or disk, which is capable of
reproducing the program at another time, the program is fixed within the meaning of the '76
Act. See id. (program stored on disk or tape is "fixed" because program is capable of being
reproduced with aid of computer).
22. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(l), (6) (1982); see 1976 REPORT, supra note 8, at 5666. The
categories of works of authorship are not intended to be exclusive. 1976 REPORT, supra note 8,
at 5666. By using the word "include" in § 102(a) of the '76 Act, Congress intended that the
categories of works of authorship should be "illustrative and not limitative." Id. Computer
programs are literary works under existing copyright law. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin
Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983) (computer program in source code or
object code is literary work), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984). The term "literary works"
does not suggest any standards of literary merit and includes computer programs to the extent
that computer programs include the programmer's expression of ideas. 1976 REPORT, supra
note 8, at 5666. Visual screen outputs are considered audio-visual works under copyright laws.
Whelan Assoc. Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1244 (3d Cir. 1986); Williams
Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1982); 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) (1982).
23. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
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in which the Court distinguished between an idea and the expression of an
idea, and allowed copyright protection for the expression of an idea only.
2
Section 102(b), therefore, denies copyright protection for any "idea, proce-
dure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discov-
ery. '2S Although the '76 Act implicitly recognized that computer programs
were copyrightable works, 2' Congress did not specifically include computer
programs in the '76 Act." Instead, Congress deferred legislative action until
24. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982); see Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). In Baker v.
Selden, the Supreme Court established the fundamental principle that copyright protects only
the expression of an idea, and not the idea itself. Baker, 101 U.S. at 101-02. In Baker, the
plaintiff, Selden, owned the copyright in a book describing an accounting system. Id. at 102.
The book contained blank forms and a description of how to use the forms as a bookkeeping
system. Id. The defendant, Baker, subsequently published books that used the bookkeeping
system described in Selden's book. Id. at 107. The Supreme Court held that Baker had not
infringed Selden's copyrights in the book because Baker had used only the system contained in
Selden's book. Id. at 107. The Supreme Court reasoned that Selden had acquired exclusive rights
only in the printing and publishing of the book and not in the use of any ideas contained in
the book. Id. at 102-03.
The Supreme Court expanded the Baker v. Selden principle in Mazer v. Stein. See Mazer
v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954). In Mazer, the Supreme Court considered whether statuettes
used as lampbases were the proper subject of copyright protection as "works of art." Id. at
204-05. In Mazer, the plaintiff, Stein, created statuettes and sold the statuettes both as lampbases
and statuettes. Id. at 203. Stein owned a registered copyright in the statuettes as "works of
art." Id. at 202-03. Subsequently, the defendant Mazer, without authorization, copied the
statuette and began selling the lamps, using the statuettes as lampbases. Id. Stein sued Mazer
for infringement of his copyright in the statuettes as "works of art." Id. at 204. Mazer argued
that Stein's intended use of the statuettes in the form of a lamp precluded copyright of the
statuettes because the statuettes would qualify for a design patent. Id. at 215. The Supreme
Court held that because the statuettes would qualify for a patent did not preclude the
copyrightability of the statuettes as works of art. Id. at 217. In distinguishing between patent
and copyright, the Supreme Court held that copyright protects only the expression of the idea,
not the idea itself. Id. The copyright in the statuettes gave Stein no exclusive rights to the use
of any statuettes in table lamps, only the exclusive right to prevent others from making lamps
that incorporated copies of Stein's statuettes. Id. The Supreme Court held that Mazer's use of
Stein's statuettes violated Stein's copyright in the statuettes. Id.
25. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982); see 1976 REPORT, supra note 8, at 5670. The 1976 Report
makes clear that § 102(b) merely codifies the existing judicial doctrine distinguishing between
expression and idea in the copyright law. Id.
26. 1976 REPORT, supra note 8, at 5667 (definition of "literary works" in legislative
history of '76 Act includes computer programs to extent programs incorporate programmer's
expression of ideas).
27. See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1976). Section 117 of the '76 Act, as originally enacted, expressly
disclaimed the application of the '76 Act to computer software. Id. Congress' intent in
maintaining the status quo of copyright protection for computer software was to allow for an
interim period to study the problems associated with the copyright of software. See 1976
REPORT, supra note 8, at 5664. The legislative history of the '76 Act, however, demonstrates
that Congress considered computer software the proper subject of copyright protection. Id.
Congress regarded computer programs as extensions of copyrightable subject matter. Id. In
response to Congress' concerns that copyright protection might extend protection to processes
or methodologies used by a programmer, the 1976 Report clarifies that the expression adopted
by the computer programmer and not the actual processes or methods embodied in the program
is the copyrightable element in a computer program. Id. at 5667, 5670.
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the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
(CONTU), the commission assigned to study the problems related to copy-
right protection of computer software, had made its recommendations to
Congress.
2
In the 1980 amendments to the '76 Act,2 ' Congress adopted the pertinent
recommendations contained in CONTU's Final Report.30 The 1980 amend-
ments expressly recognize that computer programs are copyrightable works
of authorship.3 ' The 1980 amendment to section 101 of the '76 Act defines a
computer program as a group of instructions or statements written for use
by a computer, either directly or indirectly, to accomplish a particular result. 32
28. See Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 201 (1982)).
Congress established the National Commission on New Technology Uses of Copyrighted Works
(CONTU) and charged CONTU with responsibility for conducting a three year study of the use
and reproduction of copyrighted works in connection with computers and the problems
associated with machine duplication systems. Id.
29. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (codified at
17 U.S.C. § 101, 117 (1982)).
30. See H.R. REP. No. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 6460, 6482 [hereinafter cited as 1980 REPORT]. The House Report accompanying
the passage of the 1980 amendments notes that the revisions contained in the 1980 amendments
embody the recommendations made by CONTU and clarify the application of copyright law to
computer software. See CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 1. The Final Report recom-
mended amending the copyright law to clarify that computer programs are the proper subject
of copyright law whenever a program embodies the author's original creation. Id. CONTU also
recommended that § 117 ensure that the "rightful possessors" of programs may adapt or copy
the program when necessary to use the program or when necessary to make a backup copy for
archival purposes. Id. Congress codified CONTU's recommendation to allow the "owner of a
copy of a computer program" rather than the "rightful possessor" to make copies of programs
under the conditions recommended by CONTU. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982); see infra note 32
(quoting § 117 of '76 Act).
31. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (defining computer program).
32. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). The 1980 amendment added the following definition of
"computer program" to the '76 Act:
A "computer program" is a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or
indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.
Id. The 1980 amendment to section 117 provides necessary exceptions to the creator's exclusive
right to make copies of their copyrighted works. See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982). Section 117 allows
the owner of a copy of a computer program to make spare copies of the program for archival
purposes. Id. Section 117 provides in pertinent part:
... [Ilt is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to
make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation for that computer
program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the
utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it
is used in no other manner, or
(2) that such a new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that
all archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the
computer program should cease to be rightful.
Id.
The owner of a copy of a copyrighted program does not receive necessarily any rights to
the copyright by owning a copy of the work because the '76 Act distinguishes between the
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Although the 1980 amendment to section 101 specifically recognizes that
computer programs are protectible works of authorship, the amendment
does not attempt to delineate the exact point between the unprotectible idea
and the protectible expression of a computer program.3 Congress left this
difficult and important determination for the federal judiciary to decide on
a case-by-case basis.1
4
To distinguish between the idea and expression in computer software,
courts have focused on the merger principle of idea and expression.35 Idea
and expression merge when few or no other ways of expressing a particular
idea exist. 6 Under the idea-expression merger principle, when the idea and
the expression in a computer program become inseparable, copyright law no
longer protects the program because copyright protection of the program
would give the copyright owner a monopoly on the program's idea.37 A
particular computer program, therefore, is the expression of the idea and
copyrightable when other programs can be written that achieve the same
ownership of a copy of a program and the ownership of the copyright itself. See 17 U.S.C. §
202 (1982) (ownership of exclusive rights under a copyright is distinct from ownership of
material that embodies copyrighted work).
33. See 1980 REPORT, supra note 30, at 6462. The House Report does not attempt to
define protectible expression in computer software. Id.
34. See CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 22-23. To the extent that the CONTU
Final Report is a source of legislative history, the legislative history of the 1980 amendments
suggest that the federal judiciary should delineate the proper scope of copyright protection for
computer programs. Id.; see Micro-Spare, Inc. v. Amtype Corp., 592 F. Supp. 33, 35 n.7 (D.
Mass. 1984) (CONTU Report comprises entire legislative history for amendment to § 117 of '76
Act); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 750 (N.D. I11. 1983) (CONTU Report
reflects congressional intent). But see Whelan Assoc. Inc., v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797
F.2d 1222, 1241 (3d Cir. 1986) (CONTU Report cannot substitute for legislative history of
§ 102(b) of '76 Act). CONTU's Final Report acknowledges the difficulty in separating the protec-
tible element of expression in computer programs and the idea that underlies the expression.
See CONTU FINAL. REPORT, supra note 4, at 18 (distinction between copyrightable programs
and underlying processes or ideas does not always "shimmer with clarity"). Rather than attempt
to differentiate beween the expression and the idea in computer programs, CONTU suggested
that the federal judiciary make this determination on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 23.
35. See, e.g., M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 436 (4th Cir. 1986)
(applying merger of expression and idea test to determine whether program constitutes protectible
expression) (citing Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d
Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984)); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc.,
725 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir. 1984) (inquiry for identifying idea and expression in computer
software is no different from inquiry for determining whether idea and expression have merged);
E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp. 1485. 1502 (D. Minn. 1985) (same);
see also Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967) (when few,
if any, ways exist for expressing particular idea, then idea and expression have merged).
36. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d at 1253 (idea and
expression merge if other ways of expressing idea are foreclosed as practical matter), cert.
dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984). Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738,
742 (9th Cir. 1971) (same); see also supra note 35 (discussing merger of idea and expression).
37. See M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 436 (4th Cir. 1986) (when only
one way to express idea exists, then idea and expression merge, and work is not copyrightable);
see also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984) (same); CONTU FItA REPORT, supra note 4, at
20 (when no other expression is available to achieve a particular result, programmer can use
copyrighted language without infringing copyrighted work).
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result as the particular program.38 The idea in a computer program is the
function or result that the program achieves, like a word processing pro-
gram. 9 Thus, if programmers can create other word processing programs
using a different expression that achieves a result similar to a particular
word processing program, then the particular word processing program is
the expression of an idea and is copyrightable. 40 If other programmers,
however, cannot use a different expression to achieve the particular result,




Distinguishing between protectible expression and unprotectible ideas or
processes in computer programs is essential in cases of copyright infringement
because the copyright law protects only an author's expression.4 2 To prevail on
a claim of copyright infringement, a plaintiff must establish ownership of a
valid copyright and show that the defendant impermissibly copied the
program. 43 Unless a defendant admits to copying the plaintiff's work or the
contested work is an identical copy, plaintiffs have difficulty proving copy-
right infringement because direct evidence of copying is rare. 44 Courts,
therefore, infer, copying from a showing that the defendant had access to
38. See Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1238-39
(3d Cir. 1986) (concluding that detailed structure of program was part of program's expression
when other programs exist that contain different structure but perform same function); Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir. 1984) (if programmers can
write other programs that perform same function as particular program, then program is expres-
sion of idea); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir.
1983) (same), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d
421, 436 (4th Cir. 1986) (same). In M. Kramer Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Andrews, the Fourth Circuit
stated that in the computer area the Third Circuit in Apple v. Franklin has enunciated the accept-
able test for distinguishing between idea and expression; the test is whether programmers can
write other programs that perform same function. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 436; see Johnson, 623
F. Supp. at 1501-02 (noting the Third and Ninth Circuits have framed idea-expression dichotomy
test in terms of single inquiry whether programmers can create other programs that perform same
function as copyrighted program).
39. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236 (purpose or function of utilitarian work is work's idea);
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983) (function
performed by program is idea, not expression, of program), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
40. See id. (noting that if programmers independently are capable of creating other
programs that perform same function as particular program, then particular program is expression
of idea).
41. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing point at which idea and expression
of idea merge).
42. See, e.g., Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163
(9th Cir. 1977) (no infringement occurs if defendant does not copy protected expression in
plaintiff's work); Williams Elec., Inc. v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 568 F. Supp. 1274, 1282 (N.D. I11.
1983) (no copyright infringement exists unless defendant copied protected expression in plaintiff's
game); supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text (discussing fundamental principle of copyright
law that copyright protects only expression of idea, and not idea itself).
43. See Marcelo Ramos Motta, Inc. v. Samuel Weiser, Inc., 768 F.2d 481, 483 (lst Cir.)
(to establish copyright infringement plaintiff must prove ownership of valid copyright and
"copying" by defendant, cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 596 (1985)); Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips
Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 620 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982) (same);
see also 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982) (person that violates exclusive rights of copyright owner is
infringing copyright).
44. Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222, 225 (D. Md. 1981).
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the plaintiff's work and that the defendant's work is "substantially similar"
to the plaintiff's copyrighted work.4"
Although courts have established the idea-expression merger test for
determining when a computer program constitutes protectible expression
under copyright law, the close relationship between expression and process
in computer programs makes distinguishing the copying of expression
from the underlying process or idea difficult to determine."6 Because com-
45. See Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th
Cir.) (allowing circumstantial proof of copying by showing defendant's access to copyrighted
work and "substantial similarity" between works), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Warner
Brothers, Inc. v. American Broadcasting, Inc., 654 F.2d 204, 207 (2d Cir. 1981) (same); Williams
Elec., Inc. v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 568 F. Supp. 1274, 1281 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (same). Courts infer
access to copyrighted works when a copyrighted work has been widely disseminated works.
Atari, 672 F.2d at 614; see Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Co., 654 F.2d 204, 208 (2d
Cir. 1981). Absent a showing of access, courts require the plaintiff to show that the contested
works are so "strikingly similar" that independent creation of the two programs was not
possible. Ferguson v. National Broadcasting Co., 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1978). The general
test for determining substantial similarity between two works is whether the average lay observer
would recognize contested work as being an appropriation of copyrighted work. Warner Bros.,
654 F.2d at 208. The test of substantial similarity is whether ordinary observer would recognize
contested work as having been copied from copyrighted source. Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777,
780 (8th Cir. 1962); see also Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1946) (establishing
bifurcated substantial similarity test in which expert testimony is relevant for question of copy-
ing, but not for question of unlawful appropriation); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc.
v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 1977) (bifurcated substantial similarity
test involves "extrinsic test" to determine similarity of ideas and "intrinsic test" to determine
similarity of expression). Copyright infringement does not require slavishly detailed copying.
Comptone Co. v. Rayex Corp., 251 F.2d 487, 488 (2d Cir. 1958). When the accused work
captures the "total concept and feel" of the copyrighted work, then the accused work is
substantially similar to copyrighted work. Atari, 672 F.2d at 614. Substantial similarity does
not require absolute identity, rather, courts will examine both the quantitative and qualitative
significance of copied matter. See In the Matter of Certain Personal Computers and Components
Thereof, Investigation No. 337-TA-140 (Final Decision, March 1984) (finding copying to be
qualitatively significant when accused work contained 23 of 32 most useful subroutines out of
approximately 70 subroutines in copyrighted program).
Because computer programs are stored on disks or embedded into microchips and are not
visible, application of the ordinary observer test is problematic in computer context. E.F.
Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1493 (D. Minn. 1985). Thus,
courts have adopted in form, if not by name, an iterative approach to the substantial similarity
test. Id. at 1493 (D.C. Minn. 1985); Note, Copyright Infringement of Computer Programs: A
Modification of the Substantial Similarity Test, 64 MINN. L. REv. 1264, 1294-300 (1984). The
iterative approach requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant "used" the copyrighted
work in developing the defendant's alleged copy and that the defendant created his work by
"iterative or exact duplication of substantial portions of the copyrighted work." Johnson, 623
F. Supp. at 1493. The plaintiff can establish that the defendant used the copyrighted work in
preparing the alleged copy by showing that the defendant had access to the copyrighted work
and that the works are similar enough to infer use of the copyrighted work. Id. The factfinder's
focus under the "iterative" test of substantial similarity shifts from the ordinary observer
analysis to an analysis of the "quantitative and qualitative evidence of similarities" in the
copyrighted and allegedly infringing computer programs. Id.; see Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow,
797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d Cir. 1986) (adopting single substantial similarity test in which both lay
and expert testimony is available).
46. NIMMER, THm LAw OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 1-51 (1985). Computer programs have
several characteristics that make the distinction between expression and unprotected ideas
difficult to determine in cases of nonliteral copying. Id. First, limited and highly structured
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puter programs both describe and implement a process, the expression and
the underlying process or idea in a computer program are related more
closely than in traditional forms of expression. 47 While copyright law does
not preclude protection of a program merely because the program's expres-
sion implements a process, the expression in computer programs is different
from the expression in most other literary works.48 In contrast to ordinary
literary works, the user of a program does not perceive the program's
expression directly but perceives only a product of the program's expression.
49
This derivative nature of a program's expression and the expression's close
association with the process or idea of the program, therefore, create
conceptual difficulties when applying the idea-expression distinction to com-
puter programs.5 0
To complicate the already daunting task of determining the
proper scope of copyright protection for computer programs, courts
often have trouble understanding the nature of computer pro-
grams.' Numerous programming languages,5" different kinds of pro-
programming languages restrict the forms of expression available to programmers. Id. Second,
the functional or utilitarian purposes of a program also may restrict the number of expressive
options available to programmers. Id. Third, programmers' common goal of efficient program-
ming encourages similarity in coding. Id. The scope of copyright protection should reflect the
kind of program involved. Id. Some programs involve complex artistic outputs and have a
broad range of creative expression, while other programs that direct the internal workings of
computers, are more standardized and have a more restricted range of expression. Id. at 1-52.
The scope of copyright protection should reflect, therefore, the extent of unique expression available
to create a particular program. Id. at 1-51, -52.
47. See id. at 1-10. The relationship between process and expression is closer in computer
software than possibly any other creative industry. Id. The connection between idea and
expression in computer software, therefore, is not comparable to books or articles that describe
a process. Id.
48. See M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 435 (4th Cir. 1986) (copyright
law does not preclude protection of computer programs merely because words of program
implement process or system); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 525
(9th Cir. 1984) (noting that program's utilization of its expression while implementing process
does not affect program's copyrightability); CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 21 (same).
49. See 1 Davis, Computer Software-The Final Frontier Clones, Compatibility and
Copyright, 2 THE COMPUTER LAWYER No. 6, 1, 7 (1985) (describing unique form of expression
in computer software).
50. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text (discussing difficulties in applying idea-
expression dichotomy doctrine in computer software context).
51. See Q-Co Indus., Inc. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (expressing
trouble courts have in understanding "esoterica of bytes and modules" in computer software);
SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816, 829-30 (M.D. Tenn. 1985)
(acknowledging courts' difficulty in determining which lines of program constitute misappro-
priation).
52. See Ralston & Meek, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER SCIENCE 1173 (1976) (by 1973
programmers were using more than 200 high level languages); infra notes 56-59 and accompa-
nying text (defining high-level programming languages). Examples of programming languages
that have had significant importance include APT (Automatically Programmed Tools), BASIC
(Beginners All-purpose Symbolic Instruction Code) FORTRAN (FORmula TRANslation), IPL-
V (Information Processing Language V), COBOL (Common Business-Oriented Language),
Algol (Algorithmic Language), and Lisp (List Processing). Ralston & Meek, supra, at 1173.
Major types of programming languages include: (I) Assembly, or symbolic, machine languages,
(2) Macroassembly languages, (3) Problem-oriented languages, (4) Procedure-oriented languages,
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grams," and various mediums for the storage of programs 4 make un-
derstanding the computer environment abstruse for the inexperienced.
Programming languages are classified into several levels corresponding
to the language's dependence on a particular machine's characteristics."
The three basic categories of programming languages are high-level lan-
guages, low-level languages, and machine language.16 Computers operate
by executing binary instructions, which are instructions composed of a
sequence of zeroes and ones.P Binary instructions, known as "machine
language" or "object code," are extremely difficult to understand
(a) Algebraic languages (numerical computation), (b) String-manipulating languages (text ma-
nipulation), (c) Simulation languages, and (d) Multipurpose languages. SIPPL, MICROCOMPUTER
DICTIONARY 361 (2d ed. 1981).
53. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984). Computer programs are categorized generally by
function as application or operating system programs. Id. Application programs perform a
specific function for the user, like word processing. Id. Operating system programs control the
internal functions of the computer or control the use of application programs. Id.
54. See Ralston & Meek, supra note 52, at 883-916. Computer systems have different levels
of storage, known as memory. Id. The basic categories of memory are main memory (MM) and
auxiliary memory (AM). Id. at 900. The major difference between MM and AM is that a com-
puter only can execute instructions that are in MM. Id. AM comprises all other memory, and
a computer must fetch instructions from the AM into the MM before the computer can execute
them. Id. Different forms of AM include magnetic tapes, cassette tapes, drums, fixed-head disks,
moving-disks, data cells, photocopy storages, and large core storages. Id. One common form
of AM is the "floppy disk," which is a flexible magnetic disk that resembles a phonograph.
See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d at 1243 (describing floppy
disks). MM is always read/write memory. Id. The term "read" refers to a computer's ability
to copy or accept data from memory registers, AM, and input devices like keyboards, and bar-
code scanners. See SIPPL, supra note 52, at 379 (defining term "read"). The term "write" means
to record data permanently or transiently in a storage device. Id. Read-only memory (ROM)
is memory from which a computer can read instructions but to which the computer cannot record
or "write" instructions. See id. (defining read-only memory). ROM usually refers to instructions
or data stored on a semi-conductor chip incorporated into the circuitry of the computer. See
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d Cir. 1983) (ROM
is internal permanent memory device consisting of semi-conductor chip that is incorporated into
circuitry of computer), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984). EPROMS (Erasable Programmable
Read Only Memory) are ROMs that are erasable and reprogrammable. Id.
55. Seidman & Flores, Tim HANDBOOK OF CoPUTtRs AND COMPUTING 331 (1984). The
"level of discourse" of a programming language is the language's distance from the underlying
properties of the machine that implements the program. Id.
56. See BORKING, supra note 2, at 408-13 (1985) (discussing different levels of programming
languages); see also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243
(3d Cir. 1983) (discussing three levels of computer language available for writing computer
programs), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
57. See BoRKiNG, supra note 2, at 17-18 (central processing unit (CPU) processes binary
instructions); see also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243
(3d Cir. 1983) (central processing unit (CPU) of computer can only implement binary instructions
(object code)), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984). The Third Circuit in Franklin noted that
the lowest level of computer language is machine language, known as object code, which only
uses two symbols, 0 and 1. Id. The Franklin court used the example that the instruction
"01101001" causes the Apple II computer to add two numbers and save the result. Id.
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and cumbersome to use. 8 For this reason, programmers usually write pro-
grams in either low or high-level languages, known as "source code."59
When a programmer writes a program in source code, the programmer must
run another program, called a compiler or an interpreter, to translate the
source code into binary instructions so the computer can execute the pro-
gram .6
Writing the source code is only one step in the development of a
commercial software program. 6' The process of creating a commercially
marketable program usually involves a series of stages, with each stage
comprising increasingly detailed steps toward achieving the intended result.
62
Each stage in the development process can include original works of author-
ship. 63 Although each programmer has an individual style for developing a
program, most programmers develop programs in a similar manner. The
first step involves defining the end result and program objectives. 64 The
programmer usually draws a flow chart or creates an outline that describes
the different functions or components of the program6 and may describe
the modules or subroutines necessary to accomplish the desired result." At
58. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
59. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d Cir.
1983) (programmers usually write programs in source code, which is more comprehensible to
humans), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984). Low level languages consist of alphanumeric
labels like "ADC," which instructs an Apple II computer to "add with carry." See SiPPL,
supra note 52, at 361 (low-level language is programming language whose instructions bear one-
to-one relationship with machine code). In high-level language, the instructions are familiar nota-
tions, approach ordinary English or conventional mathematical notations, and usually corres-
pond to several object code instructions. See id. (high level languages consist of familiar nota-
tions); Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1243 (high level languages like BASIC and FORTRAN use English
words and symbols). An advantage of high-level languages is that they are similar on different
computers. SIPPL, supra note 52, at 74. Low-level programming languages, however, may vary
substantially with each type of computer. Id.
60. See SIPPL, supra note 52, at 75, 196 (defining compiler and interpreters). Once the
programmer has written a program in source code, the programmer can run a compiler program
that will convert the program to a sequence of machine instructions that become the binary
object code. Id. An interpreter performs a function similar to a compiler, but an interpreter
will translate the instructions one at a time and execute them immediately. Id. at 196.
61. See FRANK, supra note 10, at 21-22 (1982) (discussing different stages in development
of computer program).
62. Id.; see SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., 605 F. Supp. 816, 828 (M.D. Tenn.
1985) (author of program begins with broad and general statement of purpose for program and
breaks each task into successively more detailed tasks until at lowest levels programmer translates
instructions into source code).
63. Brief of Amicus Curiae at 10, Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories,
797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986). The significance of the multi-stage development process of computer
programs is that each stage involves authorship in the programmer's selection of the program's
structure, sequence, pattern, and organization. Id.
64. See LEATHRUM, FOUNDATIONS OF SoFrw A DEsIGN 8 (1983) (first step in lifecycle of
computer software is defining purpose and intended results of software).
65. SIMPsoN, DESIGN OF UsER-FRIENDLY PROGRAms FOR SMALL COMPUTERS 18-25 (1985).
66. See Ralston & Meek, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER ScIENcE, supra note 52, at 1372.
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some point, the programmer must define the user interface, which controls
the manner in which the computer interacts with the user including the
visual display of the input and output formats that appear on the screen,
and the means by which the program enables the user to control the
computer.6 7 The programmer also will establish a set of detailed statements
that define the necessary instructions for the computer to execute.6 Finally,
the programmer will translate the detailed steps or program specifications
into the source code using one of many possible programming languages. 69
In addition to translating the program specifications into code, a programmer
must continually "debug" the program, which consists of locating and
correcting errors in the computer program. 70 Coding is the final step in the
creation of a computer program and represents approximately one fifth of
the total development cost.7 ' Thus, at each stage in the development of a
A subroutine is part of a program that is logically separate and performs a specific task
necessary for the program's execution. Id. A subroutine ordinarily represents the implementation
of a process that the program utilizes many times. Id.
A program module is "a logically self-contained and discrete part of a larger program."
Id. at 943. A correctly designed module accepts well-defined input, executes a specific set of
instructions, and produces an output well-defined as to content and structure. Id. Modular
programming allows a programmer to break complex tasks into smaller and less complex
subtasks, facilitating the design and testing of programs. Id. Modular programming greatly
enhances the popular technique of "top-down" program design. Id. Top-down program design
begins with the most general definition of the program's function and proceeds with a sequence
of increasingly detailed specifications. Id.
67. See SIMPSON, supra note 65, at 70 (1985) (discussing user interface as "human-
computer interface"); see also Russo & Derwin, Copyright in the "Look and Feel" of Computer
Software, 2 THE COMPUTER LAWYER No. 2, 1, 1 (1985) (design and presentation of program,
also known as "look and feel" of computer software, are becoming increasingly important for
computer software). The presentation of a program refers to the visual screens and the manner
in which the program presents useful information to the user. Id. The user-interface, often
referred to as the "look and feel" of a program, can be the most important aspect in the
commercial success of a program. See HECKEL, THE ELEMENTS OF FRIENDLY SOFTWARE DESIGN
25 (1984) (quality of user interface is important for success of software project); SIm'soN, supra
note 66, at 62-63 (researchers point out that programs have failed because of improper design
for intended users). The display design issues are significant factors for a program's success in
the user community. VICK & RAMAOORThY, HANDBOOK OF SoFTwARE ENGINEERING 538-39 (1984)
(noting that human factors are integral part of display design) (quoting LUXENBURG & KUEHN,
DISPLAY SYSTEMS ENGINEERING (1968)). The human factors that programmers must consider for
designing the program's display include the user's perception, comprehension, viewing environ-
ment, and psychological factors. Id.
68. CASSEL, THE STRUCTURED ALTERNATIVE: PROGRAM DESIGN, STYLE, AND DEBUGGING
81 (1983).
69. Id.; see supra note 52 (listing several source code programming languages).
70. See SIPPL, supra note 52, at 106 (defining debugging as process of isolating and
removing errors or malfunctions from computer or computer program).
71. FRANK, supra note 10, at 22. See Ralston & Meek, supra note 52, at 1159 (coding generally
refers to writing and debugging programs for given program specifications, while programming
includes task of preparing program specification in addition to writing program). The term "coder"
sometimes has pejorative connotations to describe a person who engages exclusively in writing
programs based on the program specifications of others. Id.
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computer program, the programmer refines his idea into an increasingly
detailed expression of the idea, and courts must decide at what point the
programmer has transformed the idea of the program into copyrightable
expression.
72
In determining what constitutes protectible expression in computer soft-
ware, judicial decisions applying the '76 Act to computer programs have
established that copyright law protects both the source and object code of
computer programs,7 3 regardless of whether the programmer has stored the
code on electromagnetic disk, tape, or in Read Only Memory (ROM). 74 In
addition, courts have established that copyright protects computer programs
regardless of whether the program performs a specific function for the user,
such as word processing, or controls the internal operation of the computer. 7"
While copyright law clearly protects the literal source and object code of a
computer program, the extent to which the copyright of a computer program
protects the nonliteral elements of a program like the structure, organization,
sequence, and user interface remains unresolved.76
72. See supra notes 35-45 and accompanying text (discussing fundamental principle of
copyright law that copyright protects expression of idea only).
73. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding
copyright protection for object code of computer program); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin
Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983) (copyright protects computer programs
whether in object or source code), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); GCA Corp. v. Chance,
217 U.S.P.Q. 718, 720 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (copyright law treats source and object code as one
work, so copyright in source code protects object code); CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4,
at 21 (machine language version of program is copy of source code because programmer can
produce copy of source code from machine language version of program). In Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., the Ninth Circuit held that copyright protects a computer
program regardless of whether the program is in source or object code. Franklin, 714 F.2d at
1249. The Franklin court found that CONTU intended copyright to protect both the instructions
communicated to people and those communicated to machines. Id. at 1248.
74. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249
(9th Cir. 1983) (copyright of computer program protects object code stored in ROM), cert.
dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); Williams Elec., Inc. v. Arctic Int'l, Inc., 586 F.2d 870, 874
(3d Cir. 1982) (same); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 453 F. Supp. 741, 749-53 (N.D. I11. 1983)
(copyright of computer program protects program whether stored on disk, tape, or ROM). The
Ninth Circuit in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp. found that programs stored
in ROM were "fixed" within the meaning of the 1976 Act and were within the protection of
copyright law. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1250. See supra note 54 (discussing different kinds of memory
storage devices).
75. See Apple Computer Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir. 1984)
(finding copyright protection for operating systems); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Com-
puter Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983) (copyright law does not per se exclude
protection of operating system programs), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984). In Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., the Franklin court did not agree with Franklin's
argument that applications software is protectible while systems software is not. Franklin, 714
F.2d at 1249. The Franklin court reasoned that the utilitarian aspect of a work will not preclude
the work from copyright protection. Id. at 1250; see supra note 53 (discussing application
programs and operating systems).
76. See Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 n.I (3rd Cir. 1986)
(using terms "structure," "sequence," and "organization" interchangeably).
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Although the case law is sparse, a few courts have addressed the issue
of which nonliteral elements of a computer program constitute protectible
expression.7 In Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.,7
for example, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania considered which elements of a copyrighted program constitute
protectible expression. 79 The defendant in Whelan, Jaslow Dental Labora-
tory, Inc. (Jaslow), hired Strohl Systems to design a software system for
various business operations of Jaslow's dental laboratory. 0 Jaslow explained
to Elaine Whelan, a fifty-percent shareholder and employee of Strohl Sys-
tems, the features, capabilities, and functions that would be useful in
operating a dental laboratory, and Elaine Whelan designed a computer
program, the Dentalab System, for operating the dental laboratory. 8' Elaine
Whelan wrote the program in Event Driven Language (EDL) for an IBM/
Series I computer.82 Both parties agreed that Strohl Systems could adapt,
77. See, e.g., Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1248
(holding that copyright protection for computer programs extends to their structure, sequence,
and organization); Q-Co Indus., Inc. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608, 616 (copyright infringe-
ment case addressing whether structure and organization of computer program constituted
protectible expression); E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1497 (D.
Minn. 1985) (addressing whether nonliteral conversion of programs from one microprocesser language
to another constitutes copyright infringement); Williams v. Arndt, 626 F. Supp. 571, 577-78 (D.
Mass. 1985) (addressing whether translation from English to source codeconstitutes copyright infringe-
ment); SAS Inst., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816, 829-30 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (same); infra notes 77-169
and accompanying text (discussing cases that have addressed issue of protectible expression in com-
puter software).
78. 609 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
79. Id. at 1320. In Whelan, the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania addressed the question whether copyright protection in plaintiff's
software extended beyond a program's source and object code. Id. The source and object codes
of the plaintiff's and defendant's programs were not similar because the defendant wrote his
program in a different programming language for a different computer. Id. The Whelan court,
therefore, had to consider whether nonliteral elements of the plaintiff's program were protectible.
Id.
80. Id. at 1317. In Whelan, Jaslow attempted to develop a program to operate his dental
laboratory, Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc. (Jaslow Laboratory). Id. at 1309. After failing to
develop a usable program, Jaslow hired Strohl Systems to design a computer program for the
Jaslow Laboratory. Id. Strohl Systems specialized in designing custom software programs. Id.
Under the initial agreement between Strohl Systems and Jaslow Laboratory, Strohl Systems was
to receive $18,000 for designing a custom dental laboratory software package. Id. The parties
agreed that Strohl Systems was to retain ownership of all software developed for Jaslow. Id. at
1310. Strohl Systems designated Elaine Whelan as the person in charge of designing and
developing the program. Id.
81. Id. at 1310. To design the Dentalab System in Whelan, Elaine Whelan studied
extensively the business operations of the Jaslow Laboratory. Id. Whelan studied in detail the
methods that Jaslow Laboratory had used to receive, process and deliver orders. Id. Elaine
Whelan also studied other business operations of the Jaslow Laboratory like invoicing, billing,
accounting and inventory control. Id. Additionally, Elaine Whelan conducted substantial
independent research into the methods of operation employed by other dental laboratories. Id.
82. Id. Event Driven Language (EDL) is a recognized computer programming language.
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market, and sell the program to other dental laboratories. 83 Subsequently,
Elaine Whelan acquired all of Strohl System's interest in the software, and
later transferred her interest to the plaintiff, Whelan Associates, Inc. (Whelan
Associates), a software development corporation of which Elaine Whelan
was the president and the controlling shareholder. 84 Whelan Associates and
Jaslow entered into a marketing agreement in which Jaslow would market
and sell the Dentalab System and would receive a commission for all of its
sales. 85 The parties agreed that upon the termination of the marketing
agreement, Jaslow would return all copies of the Dentalab System's source
and object code to Whelan Associates, and that all rights to market the
program would revert to Whelan Associates.
86
Although under the marketing agreement, Whelan Associates was to
have exclusive possession of all copies of the Dentalab System's source code,
Jaslow obtained a copy of the Dentalab System source code for the IBM/
Series 1 without Whelan Associates' consent.8 7 Jaslow formed a corporation,
Dentcom, to market computer programs, including the Whelan Associates'
Dentalab system, to the dental laboratory industry. 8 Utilizing the copy of
Whelan Associates' source code and the assistance of an expert programmer,
Jaslow developed a dental laboratory program in the BASIC programming
83. Id. at 1310. In Whelan, both parties agreed that Strohl Systems would design a
program that a skilled programmer easily could adapt for use by other dental laboratories in
the industry so that Strohl Systems could market the dental laboratory software to other
dental laboratories, and Jaslow would receive 10% of the sales price of packages sold to other
dental laboratories. Id. The agreement provided, however, that Strohl Systems would receive
all the proceeds for any modifications to the system, which Strohl Systems would sell separately
from the basic package. Id. Both Strohl Systems and Jaslow understood that the operations of
dental laboratories were substantially similar throughout the industry and that any system
developed for Jaslow Laboratories would readily be adaptable to many other dental laboratories.
Id.
84. Id. at 1317. In Whelan, Elaine Whelan formed a corporation, Whelan Associates,
Inc. (Whelan Associates), in November 1979 as a corporation to market dental laboratory
software under the tradename Dentalab. Id.
85. Id. at 1312-13. In Whelan, Strohl Systems and Jaslow Laboratories originally entered
into an agreement which provided that ownership of the software program developed by Strohl
Systems would remain in Strohl Systems and that Strohl Systems would market the program to
other dental laboratories. Id. Jaslow Laboratories agreed to demonstrate the program to
prospective purchasers and in return would receive a 10%0 commission on systems sold to other
laboratories. Id. at 1310. In 1979 Strohl Systems began marketing the dental laboratory software
package under the trade name Dentalab. Id. at 1311. In 1980, after Whelan Associates had
acquired marketing rights to the program, Whelan Associates and Jaslow Laboratory entered
into an agreement whereby Jaslow would receive 35% of the gross price of any Dentalab
programs sold and 5% for any modifications. Id. at 1317-18. Although the agreement between
Whelan Associates and Jaslow provided that Jaslow owned its own specialized IBM/Series I
program, the district court in Whelan concluded that Jaslow Laboratory did not own any proprietary
interest in the source or object code designed by Elaine Whelan for use in other dental
laboratories. Id. at 1318.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1314.
88. Id. at 1315.
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language for an IBM personal computer (IBM PC). 89 Jaslow, through
Dentcom, subsequently marketed and sold his dental laboratory program
that closely resembled the program designed by Elaine Whelan. 9° Whelan
Associates sued Jaslow for copyright infringement of Whelan Associates'
IBM/Series 1 program. 9'
In determining whether Jaslow's program infringed Whelan Associates'
copyright in the Dentalab System program, the Whelan court noted that if
copyright protection extends only to the source and object codes of a
program, then Jaslow had not infringed Whelan Associates' copyright be-
cause Elaine Whelan and Jaslow had created the two programs in different
programming languages on different computers, and the source and object
codes of the two programs were, therefore, different.92 When discussing the
distinction between the idea and expression in computer programs, the district
court in Whelan noted that the idea of a computerized system for operating
89. Id. at 1314-15. In Whelan, around May or June of 1982, Jaslow unsuccessfully
attempted to write a program in the BASIC programming language for an IBM personal
computer (IBM PC). Id. The IBM PC was less expensive and smaller than the IBM/System 1
computer, and, therefore, programs designed for the IBM PC had the greatest potential for
commercial success. Id. In attempting to write the program, Jaslow used the Dentalab source
code and tried to duplicate the identical functions, format of the visual screens, methods of
collating, file structure, and abbreviations contained in the Dentalab program for the IBM/
Series I computer. Id. Because Jaslow was unable to design and write a usable program himself,
in August 1983 Jaslow hired a skilled programmer who succeeded in developing a program
for the IBM PC. Id. Whelan Associates also designed a version of the Dentalab program for
the IBM PC that performed most of the same functions as the Dentalab program designed for
the IBM/Series 1 computer. Id.
90. Id. at 1315-16. The district court in Whelan found that Jaslow Laboratory and Dentcom
marketed Jaslow's version of the dental laboratory program under the names Dentalab and
Dentlab. Id. at 1315. The district court found that Jaslow Laboratory and Dentcom used the
name "Dentlab" to mislead the dental laboratory industry and prospective purchasers into
thinking that the Dentcom system was a version of Whelan Associate's Dentalab program. Id.
The district court in Whelan court also found that Dentcom's use of the name "Dentlab" had
confused some potential customers. Id.
91. Id. at 1320. In Whelan, Whelan Associates alleged that Jaslow had infringed Whelan
Associates' copyright in the Dentalab program by selling copies of the Dentalab system after
the termination of the parties' marketing agreement, which provided that all marketing rights
reverted to Whelan Associates. Id. Whelan Associates also alleged that Jaslow had infringed
Whelan Associates' copyright in the Dentalab program by developing and marketing a dental
laboratory program for the IBM PC that was very similar to the Dentalab program. Id.
92. Id. at 1320. In Whelan, the district court found that Jaslow had not translated the source
code from the IBM/System I program verbatim. Id. at 1315. The district court noted, however,
that Jaslow could copy the program without literally translating the source code from EDL into
BASIC. Id. Noting that literal translation of the source code was an inefficient way to copy
the Dentalab program, the district court suggested that to copy a program from one program-
ming language into a different programming language, one would study the manner in which
data flows sequentially from one function to another. Id. at 1321. A plagiarist would then copy
the program's particular manner of operation by using commands in the second programming
language that correspond functionally to the commands used in the original program. Id. at 1321.
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a dental laboratory is not subject to copyright protection. 93 The expression
of an idea in a computer program, according to the district court in Whelan,
is the manner in which the program regulates, controls, and operates the com-
puter in collecting and manipulating data to produce useful information.
4
Consequently, the district court in Whelan implicitly recognized that the ex-
pression in a computer program includes the structure and organization of the
code."5
Affirming the district court's opinion in Whelan, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit explicitly held that copyright protection can
extend beyond a computer program's literal code to the program's structure,
organization, and sequence.9 6 The Third Circuit formulated the following
distinction between expression and idea in utilitarian works: "the purpose or
function of a utilitarian work would be the work's idea, and everything that
is not necessary to that function or purpose would be part of the expression
of the idea." 97 Because other programs existed that contained different struc-
tures while performing the same function as the Dentalab and Dentcom pro-
grams, the Third Circuit concluded that the Dentcom's detailed structure was
part of the program's protectible expression. 8
93. Id.
94. Id. The district court in Whelan formulated the following definition of the expression
of the idea in a computer program:
The 'expression of the idea' in a computer program is the manner in which the
program operates, controls and, regulates the computer in receiving, assembling,
calculating, retaining, correlating, and producing useful information either on a
screen, print-out or by audio communication.
Id.
95. See id. The district court in Whelan arguably was referring implicitly to the program's
structure and organization because the structure and organization of a program dictate the method
and manner in which the program will operate and manipulate data. Id.; cf. SAS Inst. Inc. v.
S & H Computer Sys., 605 F. Supp. 816, 826 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (noting that copyright protec-
tion of structure and organization of computer program is important because appropriation of
proven design and structure of program gives competitors advantage of avoiding false starts,
redesigns and other fruitless efforts). The district court in Whelan noted that copyright law pro-
tects the expression of an idea even though one must alter or refine the expression to adapt
a program for use on other computers that respond to different instructions. Whelan, 609 F.
Supp. at 1320.
96. Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow, 797 F.2d 1222, 1248 (3d Cir. 1986).
97. Id. at 1236. In concluding that copyright protection for computer programs can extend
to the structure, sequence, and organization of a program, the Third Circuit in Whelan disagreed
with the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas in Synercom Technology,
Inc. v. University Computing Co. to "the extent that Synercom rested on the premise that there
was a difference between the copyrightability of sequence and form in the computer context and
in any other context." Id. at 1240. See Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing
Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, (N.D. Tex. 1978) (holding that input formats of computer program
were not subject to copyright protection because structure and sequence of input formats were
indistinguishable from underlying ideas); Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1240 (noting that Congress intended
ordering and sequencing to be protectible in appropriate circumstances).
98. Id. at 1238-39.
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In addition to the Third Circuit's opinion in Whelan extending copyright
protection to the structure and organization of a computer program, the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee in SAS Insti-
tute, Inc. v. S & H Computer Systems, Inc.99 also has considered whether
copyright protects these elements of a program.' °° The plaintiff in SAS, SAS
Institute, Inc. (SAS), was a corporation that marketed a computer program for
performing statistical analysis on IBM computers.' SAS owned a valid copy-
right for its statistical program marketed under the trademark "SAS."' 0 2 SAS
had begun testing a version of the SAS program for the Digital Equipment
Corporation's (DEC) VAX computer. 0 3 S & H Computer Systems, Inc. (S &
H) decided to develop a program like the SAS program to run on the VAX
computers.'°0 S & H licensed a copy of SAS' program to obtain detailed tech-
nical information, including the source code, to use in preparing S & H's con-'
version of the SAS program to run on the VAX computers.' 5
99. 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
100. SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816, 829-30 (M.D. Tenn.
1985).
101. Id. at 818, 819. In SAS, the copyright infringement involved SAS' computer program
version 79.5, which took more than five years and 18 man-years of labor to develop. Id. at
818. The SAS program Release 79.5 operated on IBM and IBM-compatible computers manu-
factured by IBM's competitors. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 818. Responding to user interests, SAS began developing non-IBM versions of
the SAS program in 1981. Id. By the time of the trial, SAS had sent over 200 copies of a
VAX version of the SAS program to test sites. Id. The defendant, S & H Computer Sys-
tems, Inc. (S & H) had attempted to design and develop its own statistical program-
PASQUEL. Id. After determining that the program would be much more difficult to market
than a program modeled after the SAS program, S & H abandoned the project. Id. at 819.
104. Id. at 819. In SAS, several professors at Vanderbilt University wanted to use the SAS
program. Id. Since Vanderbilt did not have an IBM computer and SAS had not yet announced
its non-IBM version of the SAS program, the professors formed a limited partnership under
the name "Portable Statistical Analysis Systems, Ltd." (PSAS, Ltd.) to develop a conversion
of the SAS program to operate on the VAX computer. Id. at 820. In an agreement between
PSAS, Ltd. and S & H, the parties agreed to develop a computer software package similar to
SAS. Id.
105. Id. at 820-21. In SAS, SAS did not sell copies of its statistical analysis system, but
sold licenses to use copies of the program. Id. When S & H licensed the SAS program, S & H
did not disclose its purpose in acquiring a license for the SAS program. Id. The SAS court
found that S & H breached an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing by licensing the SAS
program for the sole purpose of obtaining proprietary materials, which S & H used to develop
a competing program. Id. at 827-28. SAS and S & H entered into a licensing agreement whereby
S & H agreed to use the SAS program on a specific IBM machine located at Tennessee State
University in Nashville. Id. Under the terms of the license agreement, S & H agreed not to
further distribute the SAS program, allow time sharing use of the SAS program, or make any
copies of the program except for back-up purposes. Id. The SAS court found that S & H had
violated the licensing agreement by licensing the program with the intent to use technical
information about the SAS program to develop a similar program for the VAX computer. Id.
13931986]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
SAS sued S & H for copyright infringement.'°6
At the conclusion of the trial, the SAS court found that S & H had infr-
inged SAS' copyright. °7 The SAS court held that S & H's INDAS program, S
& H's version of the SAS program, was an unlawful copy of the SAS program
that violated SAS' valid copyright in the program.'"" The SAS court rejected
S & H's argument that S & H merely had copied unprotectible ideas by copy-
ing only the organization and structure of the SAS program. °9
To support its holding that the INDAS program was an illegal copy of the
SAS program, the SAS court articulated numerous indicia of direct or sub-
stantially similar copying of the SAS program." 0 The SAS court consid-
ered as evidence of copying S & H's use of a close paraphrase of the SAS
program's organization, and the "slavish copying" by S & H of the SAS
106. Id. at 828. In SAS, SAS alleged that S & H had made an unknown number of
unauthorized copies of the SAS source code during the development of its conversion program,
INDAS. Id. Furthermore, SAS claimed that the INDAS program was either a "copy" or a
"derivative work" based on the SAS program, and that in either case, S & H had infringed
SAS' copyright. Id.
107. Id. at 821. In SAS, since the IBM computer on which S & H had agreed exclusively
to operate the SAS program could not execute source code instructions in ASCII, the SAS
court held that a copy of source code, which S & H had translated into ASCII, could not
constitute a back-up copy of the SAS program. Id. Consequently, the SAS court found that S
& H had breached the licensing agreement by making an unauthorized copy. Id.; see supra note
105 and accompanying text (discussing terms of licensing agreement between SAS and S & H).
108. SAS, 605 F. Supp. at 830. In addition to 44 specific instances of copying proven at
trial, the court in SAS also found that copying of the SAS program's organization and structural
detail pervaded the S & H program. Id. The court noted that SAS' expert, Dr. Peterson,
testified that in his opinion, the early source code for the S & H program was substantially
similar to the SAS source code. Id. at 822. The court, therefore, found that S & H's program
was substantially similar to the SAS program and infringed the copyright in the SAS program.
Id. at 830.
109. Id. at 829. In SAS, S & H argued that by writing independently the code for each
of the lowest level tasks, S & H had copied only the organizational scheme of the SAS program,
which S & H asserted was an unprotectible idea of the program. Id. The SAS court did not
believe S & H's assertion that S & H had created its source code independently. Id. The SAS
court noted that even if S & H had distributed an outline of the SAS program to programmers,
and S & H programmers independently created the INDAS source code based on the outline, such
a process would have duplicated the expression in the SAS program. Id.; see infra
note 118 and accompanying text (discussing case in which employees wrote "original" text for
textbook based on outlines and Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. court
concluded that such process resulted in duplication of expression). The SAS court noted thai
whether similarities in a program are similarities of ideas or similarities of expression is a
question of fact. SAS, 605 F. Supp. at 829. The SAS court found that as a matter of fact S &
H had duplicated the expression of the SAS program. Id.
110. SAS, 605 F. Supp. at 822. In SAS, the district court relied on SAS' expert witness
who testified that the S & H program contained at least 44 specific instances of direct copying
from the SAS source code and another 18 examples of source code "similar" to the SAS code.
Id. The SAS court rejected S & H's assertion that 44 instances of literal copying were
insubstantial as a matter of law. Id. at 830.
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program's structural detail."' The SAS court noted that S & H's utilization
of the SAS program's source code in preparing the INDAS program was an
additional indication of copying."12 In addition, the SAS court regarded the
existence of undocumented options from the SAS program in the INDAS
program as further evidence of copying." 3 S & H's lack of design documen-
tation led the SAS court to conclude that S & H had adopted SAS' design
documentation in detail and had appropriated a large part of the SAS
program's design." '4 Finally, the SAS court noted that evidence of S & H's
attempt to disguise its copying of the SAS program and S & H's copying of
nonfunctional features in the SAS program contributed to the SAS court's
holding of infringement. ' 5
Addressing the issue of copying a program's structure and organization,
the SAS court found that S & H had saved substantial time and effort,
avoiding the risk and expense of "dead ends, redesigns, and other fruitless
efforts" by copying the proven structure of the SAS program."16 The SAS
court cited the reasoning of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York in Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.' '1
The Meredith court found that the process in which Meredith employees
distributed portions of an outline of a textbook to freelance writers who wrote
"original" text based on the outline resulted in the copying of protectible ex-
pression and not ideas."8 The court in SAS, therefore, concluded that under
the Meredith court's reasoning, even if S & H had not copied from the source
code of the SAS program, S & H's use of a detailed outline of the SAS pro-
11l. Id. at 826.
112. Id. at 826. In SAS, the district court found that S & H's programmers systematically
and pervasively relied on the SAS source code when developing the S & H program. Id.
113. Id. at 824. The district court in SAS noted that SAS had not documented many
elements of the SAS user language such as the set of commands and instructions that enable
the user to make the program achieve certain results. Id. According to the SAS court, S & H
could only have learned of the existence of these undocumented options by close examination
of SAS' source code. Id.
114. Id. at 824. In SAS, S & H produced a document known as "DOCOUT," which S &
H claimed was the design document for the INDAS program. Id. The SAS court, however,
found that this document was an extraction of the SAS source code's "comments," which
describe the function of the accompanying source code. Id. The SAS court particularly noted
that the DOCOUT document dealt almost entirely with "interface routines" and that the S &
H program contained 69 out of the 70 "interface routines" in the SAS program. Id. Conse-
quently, the SAS court found that S & H had appropriated the design of the SAS source code
before and during the creation of DOCOUT. Id.
115. Id. at 823-24.
116. Id. at 826.
117. 378 F. Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 500 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1974), permanent injunction
entered, 413 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
118. Id. at 386-87.
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gram in preparing S & H's program would have constituted copyright infringe-
ment. I I9
In a case similar to Whelan and SAS, the United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota in E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of
America'20 recognized that copyright protection extends beyond a computer
program's literal code.' 2' The plaintiff in Johnson, E.F. Johnson Co. (John-
son), a manufacturer of land-based communication systems, developed a
logic trunked radio system (LTR), which established an efficient means of
two-way communication between mobile radio units and base stations. 22 The
principal component of Johnson's LTR system was the computer software
stored in the mobile radios and base stations. 23 Johnson owned a valid
copyright for the software contained in the mobile units. 24 The defendant,
Uniden Corporation of America (Uniden), a distributor of electrical equip-
ment including mobile radios, designed a mobile radio that contained soft-
ware capable of utilizing Johnson's LTR system. 25 In developing the software
for the LTR-compatible mobile radios, Uniden disassembled Johnson's LTR
software and prepared flow charts for its software using Johnson's LTR
software. 26 Johnson subsequently examined Uniden's software and discov-
ered that the software contained in Uniden's mobile units had been copied
from Johnson's LTR software. 27 Johnson, consequently, sued Uniden for
copyright infringement and sought a preliminary injunction to restrain
119. SAS, 605 F. Supp. at 826.
120. 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D. Minn. 1985); see Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental
Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1246 (3d Cir. 1986); (involving copyright protection of nonliteral
elements of computer program); SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp.
816, 829-30 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (same).
121. Johnson, 623 F. Supp. at 1497.
122. Id. at 1489.
123. Id. Johnson loaded its software into a Read-Only Memory (ROM) microchip. Id..
The mobile radios use an Intel 8049 microprocessor. Id. A two-way communication system
employing the trunked LTR software is more efficient than traditional two-way communication
systems because the software creates an uninterrupted stream of communications. Id. The
computer software creates the uninterrupted stream by pooling the radio frequencies and making
all radio channels accessible to every system user. Id.
124. Id. at 1488. Registration of a copyright is prima facie evidence of valid ownership in
a copyright. Id. at 1492; Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1092
n.1 (2d .Cir. 1977); 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1982).
125. Johnson, 623 F. Supp. at 1489.
126. Id. at 1490. Disassembly is a process involving the translation of the machine readable
object code into source code. Id. SiPPL, supra note 52, at 115 (disassembly is retranslation of
machine language into mnemonics).
127. Johnson, 623 F. Supp. at 1490. In Johnson, Johnson's engineers scrutinized one of
Uniden's compatible radios at Johnson's lab. Id. The Johnson engineers removed the Erasable
Programmable Read-Only Memory microchip (EPROM) from Uniden's radio, copied (dumped)
the machine language stored on the microchip into a computer, and disassembled the object




Uniden from selling or marketing Uniden's LTR-compatible radio soft-
ware.
28
Before the trial court on Johnson's motion for a preliminary injunction,
Uniden attempted to show that the Johnson and Uniden LTR programs were
dissimilar by introducing an exhibit consisting of a line-by-line comparison
of the Johnson and Uniden codes. 2 9 The Johnson court noted that the
machine-languages utilized by the two microprocessors were different because
the Johnson radios employed an Intel microprocessor while the Uniden
radios used an Hitachi microprocessor. 30 In dismissing the probative value
of Uniden's exhibit, which consisted of an attempt to convert the Intel code
into the Hitachi code and to compare the two LTR programs on a line-by-
line basis, the Johnson court found that such a comparison was meaningless
because differences in the machine languages made a literal translation of
the programs virtually impossible.' 3 ' Rather than considering the two LTR
programs on a line-by-line basis, the Johnson court focused on the overall
structure and design of the programs.'3 2 Finding a remarkable similarity in
the overall design and structure of the two programs and several examples
of direct copying, the Johnson court concluded that the programs were
substantially similar. 33 To support its finding of substantial similarity, the
Johnson court noted that Uniden's program contained identical error detec-
tion tables, the same superfluous instructions, several identical subroutines,
a virtually exact paraphrase of Johnson's code, and a strong similarity in the
overall design of the Uniden and Johnson LTR programs.'3 "
128. Id. at 1497.
129. Id. at 1497-98.
130. Id. at 1497. The district court in Johnson noted that a given step in either the Johnson
or Uniden program would require a different number of commands depending on whether the
program used the Intel or Hitachi microprocessor language. Id.
131. See id. at 1497-98 (citing Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 609
F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1985)). The Johnson court noted that the literal translation of a
program from one microprocessor language to another would be extremely difficult, if not
impossible. Id. The Johnson court also found Uniden's line-by-line comparison unconvincing
because Uniden's witness admitted that the translation represented in Uniden's exhibit would
not "run" without further modification and that disassembled versions of two programs from
different machines would not demonstrate a line-by-line correlation. Id.
132. See id. at 1493-97 (recognizing marked similarity in overall design of program and
finding that programs were substantially similar).
133. Id. at 1497.
134. Id. The district court in Johnson found especially probative of substantial similarity
the existence of identical errors, superfluous instructions, the identity of 38 out of 44 subroutines,
and the "marked similarity in overall design." Id.; see Williams Elec., Inc. v. Arctic Int'l, 685
F.2d 870, 876 (3d Cir. 1982) (existence of identical errors in copyrighted program and contested
work is evidence of copying); SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816,
824 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (presence of nonfunctional feature in contested program is strong
evidence that defendant copied the functionless instruction from plaintiff's program).
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Addressing Uniden's defense that Uniden only copied the idea of a
mobile radio compatible with the LTR-system, the Johnson court noted that
idea-expression dichotomy in computer software depends on the single
inquiry whether programmers can write other programs that perform the
identical function as the copyrighted program.' The Johnson court noted
that the translation, flow charting, and analyzing of a competitor's code in
itself does not constitute an infringement.1 6 The parties in Johnson agreed
that translating and analyzing a competitor's code was a standard practice
in the computer software industry.'37 The court noted that if Uniden had
surveyed only a general outline of the Johnson program and had created
detailed code through its own independent imagination and creativity, then
Johnson would not have a copyright infringement claim.'3 Accordingly, the
Johnson court found that the Johnson program was protectible expression
because Johnson's code was not the "only and essential meaqs" of creating
LTR-compatible software. 3 9 The Johnson court thus concluded that Uniden
copied the expression in Johnson's LTR program because Uniden independ-
ently could have created an LTR compatible mobile radio without duplication
of the Johnson program. 40
Although the Whelan, SAS, and Johnson courts recognized that copy-
right protects the structure and organization of a computer program,'' the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in Q-Co
Industries, Inc. v. Hoffman'42 articulated a narrower scope of copyright
135. Johnson, 623 F. Supp. at 1502 (citing Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l Inc.,
725 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir. 1984)); Apple Computer Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714
F.2d 1240, 1251 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984)).
136. Johnson, 623 F. Supp. at 1501-02 n.17.
137. Id.
138. Id. Compare Synercom Technology v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003,
1013 n.5, (N.D. Tex. 1978) (preparation of computer program in any programming language
from general description'of program is not copy of program, but translation from detailed
description of problem solution, such as flowchart or step-by-step set of instructions is copy of
program) with SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816, 829-30 (M.D.
Tenn. 1985) (taking copyrighted program, duplicating organization of program in outline form,
assigning portions of program to programmers for independent creation, combined with access
to source code could constitute copyright infringement).
139. Johnson, 623 F. Supp. at 1501-03. In Johnson, the district court found that except
for one small aspect of Johnson's program, the "Barker code" essential for establishing
communications, Uniden could have created independently a program compatible with Johnson's
LTR system. Id. at 1503.
140. Id. at 1503.
141. See Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1246 (3d
Cir. 1986) (holding that copyright protection for computer programs extends to program's struc-
ture, sequence, and organization); E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp. 1485,
1493-97 (D. Minn. 1985) (recognizing copyright protection for nonliteral elements of computer pro-
grams); SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816, 829-30 (M.D. Tenn. 1985)
(same). r
142. 625 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
1398 [Vol. 43:1373
COMPUTER PROGRAMS
protection for computer programs.', 3 In Q-Co, the plaintiff, Q-Co In-
dustries, Inc. (Q-Co), was a corporation that provided prompting equip-
ment and services to various customers in business, entertainment, and
government.'" Q-Co marketed prompting software packages designed for
use on Atari computers.' 45 Q-Co had hired Sidney Hoffman to design a
teleprompting program for Q-Co, later entitled the VPS-500.'" At Hoffman's
request, Q-Co had hired Dilip Som to aid Hoffman in developing the VPS-
500.' 4 In December 1984, Som had begun working on the development of a
prompting program for the IBM PC.' 4 By the end of December 1984,
Hoffman and Som had finished the VPS-500, and Hoffman voluntarily
terminated his employment with Q-Co.'49 In January 1985, Hoffman incor-
porated Computer Prompting Corporation (CPC), and Som and Hoffman
became vice-presidents of CPC with both men owning half of CPC's stock.'"
CPC introduced its CPC-1000 teleprompting program for the IBM PC in
April 1985, and in June 1985 Q-Co filed suit against Hoffman, Som, and
CPC for copyright infringement of Q-Co's VPS-500 program. '
143. Id. at 616.
144. Id. at 610. In Q-Co, the plaintiff, Q-Co Industries, Inc. (Q-Co) provided customers
with teleprompters or prompters, which are machines that scroll text in front of a speaker
allowing the speaker to look straight ahead while reading text and thus avoid the appearance
of reading. Id.
145. Id. at 610-11.
146. Id. at 611. In Q-Co, Q-Co hired Hoffman as an employee at will. Id. As an employee
of Q-Co, Hoffman did not enter into any employment agreement, confidentiality agreement,
or agreement not to compete. Id.
147. Id. In Q-Co, the district court noted that although Q-Co had hired Som as a
consultant, Q-Co mostly was unaware of Som's work because Hoffman had conducted almost
all of the communications between Q-Co, Hoffman, and Som. Id. at 611-12. As a consultant
for Q-Co, Som did not enter into any employment agreement, confidentiality agreement, or
agreement not to compete. Id. at 611. In developing the prompter program for Q-Co, Hoffman
and Som worked closely together and used only Q-Co's supplies and equipment. Id. Unknown
to either Q-Co or Hoffman, Som employed George Schwenk to work on the VPS-500 and paid
Schwenk $1,000 for his services. Id. at 612. The Q-Co court found that Q-Co's program, the
VPS-500, was the joint product of Som and Hoffman. Id. at 611.
148. Id. at 612. In Q-Co, Sor and Hoffman decided to develop a prompter program for
the IMB PC. Id. The IBM PC had a larger memory capacity than the Atari computer, which
made an IBM PC prompter more attractive to customers. Id. at 611. Developing a prompter program
for the IBM PC, however, was more difficult than developing one for the Atari computer
because the Atari computer contained a graphics chip that facilitated the generation and scrolling
of characters. Id. The IBM PC did not contain a graphics chip but required a lengthy and
complicated software program to generate and scroll large characters. Id.
149. Id. at 612.
150. Id. at 613. In Q-Co, Som engaged the services of Martin Smith to help Som in
developing a prompter program for the IBM PC. Id. at 612-13. By the end of February 1985,
Som had finished his work for Q-Co and was working with Smith on developing the CPC-
1000, the prompting program for the IBM PC. Id.
151. Id. at 613. In Q-Co, Hoffman and Sor introduced the CPC-1000 at the National
Association of Broadcasters (NAB) in Las Vegas. Id. Sor and Hoffman prepared a brochure
introducing the CPC-1000 at the NAB, and the brochure promoted the new program's ability
to operate on the IBM PC. Id.
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Although the Q-Co court found that the design and structure of the
VPS-500 and the CPC-1000 programs were similar, the Q-Co court found
no copyright infringement.'5 2 Recognizing that the CPC-1000 program had
four modules that corresponded functionally to four of the VPS-500's twelve
modules,'13 the Q-Co court noted that the corresponding modules were similar
in structure and organizatiofn.' 5I While finding that Som was completely familiar
with the VPS-500 and had employed the "structure and concept of the
VPS-500," the court found no direct evidence that Som had used any VPS
materials in creating the CPC-1000.' ss The Q-Co court also recognized that
literal copying of the VPS-500 program was not possible because the two pro-
grams were written in different programming languages.' 6 Applying the idea-
expression dichotomy test, the Q-Co court reasoned that the four CPC-1000
modules would be inherent in any prompting program and, therefore, con-
stituted unprotectible ideas. 7
In arriving at its conclusion that the CPC-1000 program did not infringe
Q-Co's copyright in the VPS-500 program, the Q-Co court distinguished the
SAS case, a case in which the SAS court found that creating original source
code from the outline of another program could constitute copyright infringe-
ment. 8 Although Som utilized the basic outline of the VPS-500 program,
in the Q-Co court's opinion, Som's use of the outline to write the CPC-1000
code did not constitute copyright infringement.'59 In distinguishing the SAS
case, the Q-Co court noted that the existence and organization of the four
modules in the CPC-1000 was inherent in the design of any prompting
program.6' The idea-expression merger doctrine, therefore, would permit
Som to copy those elements of the VPS-500 program, like the organization
and structure, that were an inherent part of any prompting program.' 6
The Q-Co court further distinguished the SAS case on the basis that "slavish
copying" of the VPS-500 program was impossible in the CPC-1000 program
because of the differences in hardware. 62 The Q-Co court, therefore, held
that CPC had not infringed Q-Co's copyright because Q-Co merely had
copied unprotectible ideas from the VPS program.
63
152. Id. at 616.
153. Id. at 614.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 615.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 616.
158. Id.
159. Id.; see SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816, 830 (M.D.
Tenn. 1985) (noting that process in which programmers create original code from outline of
copyrighted program would constitute copyright infringement).






While the Whelan, SAS, Johnson, and Q-Co courts considered whether
copying the nonliteral elements of a computer program constituted copyright
infringement, the United States District Court for the District of Massachu-
setts in Williams v. Arndt and Harvard Investment Service, Inc. 164 considered
whether copying the English language expression contained in a commodities
investment manual by creating a computer program from the detailed steps
outlined in the investment manual constituted copyright infringement. 6 5 In
rejecting Arndt's defense that creating source code from the English language
contained in the trading manual constituted a new expression of the invest-
ment system idea, the Williams court found that Arndt merely had translated
Williams' English language expression of an investment method into a
computer programming language.'6 The Williams court, therefore, found
that the two contested trading systems, Williams' manuals and Arndt's
programs, were substantially similar in overall structure and held that Arndt's
164. 626 F. Supp. 571 (D. Mass. 1985); see Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory,
Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1246 (3d Cir. 1986) (involving alleged copying of nonliteral elements of
computer program); Q-Co Indus., Inc. v. Sidney Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. at 615-16 (same); E.F.
Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1490-97 (D. Minn. 1985) (same);
SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816, 829-30 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (same).
165. Williams, 626 F. Supp. at 577. The plaintiff in Williams, Larry Williams, an
investment advisor, wrote an investment manual entitled the Floor Trader's Method (FTM) that
described a step-by-step method for trading in various commodities. Id. at 573. Williams was
an active commodities trader who had authored several books, articles, and pamphlets on
commodities trading. Id. Williams also conducted several seminars on commodities trading
every year. Id. The defendant, George Arndt, created a computer program from a copy of the
FTM. Id. at 574. Arndt received a draft of the FTM manual that did not have any notice of
copyright affixed. Id. Arndt received the FTM manual from Jerry Snyder who had obtained
Williams' permission to have his copy of the FTM programmed for a computer. Id.
Williams granted Snyder permission to have the FTM computerized on the condition that
Snyder would not disclose the method. Id. Snyder had sent Arndt a copy of the FTM and had
asked Arndt to create a program based on the FTM manual. Id. Arndt never created a computer
program to Snyder's satisfaction. Id. After Snyder had terminated the business relationship,
Arndt proceeded to market and sell a computer program that employed the step-by-step method
described in the FTM manual. Id. Snyder informed Williams that Arndt was selling the FTM
in a computer program. Id. Williams' attorney sent Arndt a letter in May 1982 demanding that
Arndt discontinue selling Arndt's computer program. Id. at 575. In March 1982 Williams'
attorney sent Arndt another letter advising Arndt that Williams would take legal action if Arndt
continued to sell his program. Id. On November 1, 1983, Williams sued Arndt for copyright
infringement. Id. at 576. At trial, Arndt claimed that the source code he devised constituted a
"new and different expression of the idea of a market trading system." Id. at 576-77. In finding
Arndt had infringed Williams' copyright, the Williams court reasoned that if copyright law did
not protect expressions translated into source code, then every expression would be vulnerable
to copying into source code form. Id. at 578.
166. Id. at 577-78. The district court in Williams found that for a skilled programmer, the
conversion of known input, output, and the steps necessary to produce the output is a mere
clerical function, which does not involve the new expression of an idea. Id. at 577. See In the
Matter of the Application of John W.C. Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809, 816-17 n.6 (C.C.P.A. 1980)
(conversion of known input and known output into computer language is merely clerical
function), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981).
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program infringed Williams' copyright in the investment manual., 67
The courts in Whelan, SAS, Johnson, and Williams extend copyright
protection beyond the literal code of a computer program.'68 In extending
copyright protection beyond the source and object code of computer programs,
these cases establish that copying the expression in a program, whether em-
bodied in computer programming language, English, or other symbolic
representation, constitutes a copyright infringement.'6 9 Whelan, SAS, Williams,
and Johnson recognize in varying degrees that copyright protection extends
to the structure and organization of computer programs.' By striking a balance
between protecting the monetary incentives for program developers and the
free dissemination of ideas, courts have established a standard to distinguish
between the protectible expression and unprotectible ideas in the nonliteral
elements of a computer program.'" The established standard is whether the
particular structure and organization of a program is the only and essential
means or necessary to achieve a desired result.'
The deceptively simple idea-expression standard sometimes is difficult to
apply. The SAS court, for example, suggested that creating source code from
167. Id. at 576, 579. The district court in Williams found that Williams' manual and
Arndt's programs were substantially similar, even though Williams had written the FTM manual
in English and Arndt had written his computer program in source code. Id.
168. See Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1246 (3d
Cir. 1986) (holding that copyright protection for computer programs extends to program's struc-
ture, sequence, and organization); Williams v. Arndt, 626 F. Supp. 571, 577-78 (D. Mass. 1985)
(finding that mere translation of commodities trading method from English into computer pro-
gramming language constitutes copyright infringements); E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of
Am., 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1493-979 (D. Minn. 1985) (recognizing copyright protection for nonliteral
elements of computer program); SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp.
816, 829-30 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (same); supra notes 77-140, 164-67 and accompanying text (discussing
cases that extend copyright protection beyond literal code of program).
169. See Williams v. Arndt, 626 F. Supp. 571, 577-78 (D. Mass. 1985) (copyright protects
expression of idea in detailed English instructions from unauthorized translation or conversion
into computer programming language); Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.,
609 F. Supp. 1307, 1320-21 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (copyright protects expression of idea embodied in
computer program even though programmer must adapt or modify expression to run on
computers that require different source codes).
170. See supra note 168 (discussing Johnson, SAS, Whelan, and Williams cases).
171. See infra note 172 (discussing cases that have established standard to distinguish
between protectible expression and unprotectible ideas in computer program).
172. See Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d Cir. 1986)
(everything that is not necessary to program's purpose or function is protectible expression of
idea); M. Kramer Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 436 (4th Cir. 1985) (if only one
way to express idea exists, idea and expression merge and there is no copyrightable material);
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting that
if programmers can write other programs that perform same function as particular program,
then program is expression of idea); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714
F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983) (noting that no merger of idea and expression occurs when other
methods for expressing idea are not foreclosed as practical matter), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S.
1033 (1984); E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1502 (D.
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an outline of a competitor's source code would constitute an appropriation
of protectible expression.'"3 The Johnson court, however, noted that the in-
dependent creation of source code from the general outline of a competitor's
program would not constitute copyright infringement.'74 The SAS and Johnson
courts' positions are not inconsistent necessarily. If an outline is general enough
to represent a basic structure necessary to achieve a desired result, then using
such an outline to create source code would not result in copyright infringe-
ment.' 7 If, however, the outline represented only one of innumerable ways
to organize and structure a computer program, then the outline would em-
body protectible expression.' 76 Consequently, if a programmer creates source
code that embodies the outline's detailed structure and organization, such crea-
tion would constitute copyright infringement. "7
The Q-Co case illustrates the difficulty of applying the idea-expression
standard to a particular set of facts.17  The Q-Co court, after concluding
that the structure and organization of the contested programs were similar,
determined that the similarity did not constitute copyright infringement
because the structure and organization of the modules in Q-Co's program
would be inherent in any prompter software. 79 The Q-Co court, however,
arguably misapplied the idea-expression doctrine. 80 The Q-Co court dis-
missed the importance of the similarities in structure by stating that differ-
ences in hardware made structural copying impossible.'"" Although the district
court in Q-Co noted that the CPC-1000 was not a paraphrase of the VPS-
500, the Q-Co court refused to recognize that programmers can appropriate
Minn. 1985) (idea-expression dichotomy test involves single inquiry of whether programmers
can write independently other programs that perform same function as copyrighted program);
CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 20 (idea-expression distinction in computer context
means that when specific instructions, though previously copyrighted, are "only and essential
means" of accomplishing task, then later use of those instructions by another programmer is
not copyright infringement); supra notes 35-45 and accompanying text (discussing merger of
idea and expression in computer software).
173. SAS, 605 F. Supp. at 826.
174. Johnson, 623 F. Supp. at 1501 n.17.
175. See supra note 172 (explaining that when particular work represents only and essential
means of achieving result, idea and expression have merged, and work represents unprotectible idea).
176. See supra note 38 (explaining expression of idea in computer software).
177. See supra notes 35-41, 172 and accompanying text (discussing distinction between idea and
expression in computer software).
178. See Q-Co Indus., Inc. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (court applying
idea-expression distinction analysis).
179. Id. at 614-16.
180. See id. (recognizing that copyright extends only to forms of expression and not ideas,
but arguably misapplying test for determining what constitutes expression of idea in computer
program); infra notes 181-189 and accompanying text (discussing how Q-Co court arguably
misapplied idea-expression dichotomy doctrine); supra notes 35-45, 171-72 and accompanying text
(discussing idea-expression dichotomy in computer software).
181. Id. at 616.
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a program's protectible expression even though a programmer modifies or
adapts the program to operate on a different computer.'8 2 Whelan, SAS, and
Johnson, however, suggest that such nonliteral copying of a program, known
as the "conversion" of a program, constitutes copyright infringement.' 3
According to Q-Co's expert, Dr. Friedberg, the close correspondence
between the four modules, including similarities in the structure, organiza-
tion, and a few textual similarities, was surprising except when viewed in the
context of conversion. 84 Although the four modules were a necessary design
feature for the VPS-500 because of the memory limitations on the Atari
computer, the IBM PC did not have the same memory limitations and,
therefore, did not require the four-module design. 85. According to Dr.
Friedberg, the only logical explanation for the four-module design was CPC's
conversion of the Q-Co program. 86 Dr. Friedberg's testimony, therefore,
casts doubt on the court's conclusion that the four modules were "inherent"
in the design of any prompting program.
87
The evidence of similarities outlined by the Q-Co court suggests that the
structure and organization of the four modules in the VPS-500 program
constituted protectible expression because these elements were not the
"only and essential means" of creating a prompter program.' U The Q-
Co court, therefore, arguably determined incorrectly that CPC merely copied
the idea of the VPS-500.1
89
While the Whelan, SAS, Williams, and Johnson courts recognize the
copyright protection of the structure and organization of computer pro-
182. Id. at 615-16.
183. See E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1497 (D. Minn.
1985) (concluding that Uniden's conversion of Johnson's LTR software to operate on Hitachi
microprocessor constituted copyright infringement); SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys.,
Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816, 829-30 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (concluding that S & H's conversion of SAS'
program constituted copyright infringement); Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory,
Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307, 1320-21 (E.D. Penn. 1985) (concluding that Jaslow's conversion of
Dentalab program, which operates on IBM Series/l computer, to operate on IBM-PC constituted
copyright infringement), aff'd, 797 F.2d 1222, 1246 (3d Cir. 1986).
184. Q-Co, 625 F. Supp. at 614.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See Q-Co, 625 F. Supp. at 614 (discussing testimony of Q-Co's expert witness).
188. See id. at 613-15 (discussing similarities between CPC-1000 and VPS-500 programs);
Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d Cir. 1986)
(everything not necessary to purpose or function of program is part of program's expression
of idea); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l., Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir. 1984) (if
programmers can write other programs that perform same function as particular program, then
program is expression of idea); E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp. 1485,
1502 (D. Minn. 1985) (idea-expression dichotomy test involves single inquiry of whether
programmers can write independently other programs that perform same function as copyrighted
program); CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 20 (idea-expression distinction in computer
context means that when specific instructions though previously copyrighted are "only and essen-
tial means" of accomplishing task, then later use by another is not infringement).




grams, '" 0 these cases are not as clear about whether the user interface of
a program constitutes protectible expression under copyright law. Despite the
uncertainty surrounding the protectibility of the user interface through the
copyright laws, the user interface of a commercial software package is
a valuable element of the program.' 9' In at least one case, a federal district
court has recognized that the user interface comprised an important element
in the design of user-oriented programs."12 In Dickerman Associates v. Tiverton
Bottled Gas Co.,"9 3 the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts decided a case involving the trade secrecy protection of a pro-
gram designed to provide accounting and management information to indepen-
dent petroleum jobbers."'9 In language pertinent to the copyright protection
of a program's user interface, the court noted that the visual screens
demonstrated numerous decisions in the design of the program. 95 Recogniz-
ing that the visual displays of any accounting program would include certain
basic information, the Dickerman court acknowledged that the screen would
not have to include other options, like certain financial data." 6 The Dicker-
man court also noted that the programmers made design decisions concerning
the arrangements of menus and submenus, the way in which users would ac-
cess submenus, how many submenus each function should include, and how
to organize the information on each screen. ' The Dickerman court
190. See supra note 168 (discussing Johnson, SAS, Whelan and Williams cases).
191. See supra note 67 (noting that user interface can be most valuable element of user-
oriented program).
192. See Dickerman Assoc., Inc. v. Tiverton Bottled Gas Co., 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 529,
530-31 (D. Mass. 1984) (recognizing user interface as valuable element in design of computer
program).
193. 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 529 (D. Mass. 1984).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 530-31. The court in Dickerman recognized that the user interface is an impor-
tant element in the organization of a computer program:
The JMS program starts with a "Systems Options Menu," the main menu, which
includes five major and five minor groupings of functional options . . . The major
groupings determine the organization of the system and were chosen by the designers
... from an infinite number of alternatives ...
The customer display screen demonstrates numerous design decisions. While the
inclusion of certain information, name, address, billing and payment data is self
evident, it is less imperative that this screen should for example show year to date of
delivery and payment data, or that it be arranged in the precise manner of the JMS.
In addition to choosing the particular five major groupings.., the designers thus
made decisions concerning the specific manner in which these submenus are to be
used, how they are to be accessed, how many screens to use, and how to arrange the
information on each screen. It is the organization of the JMS program, with its five
major groupings, combined with the particular features within the system and the
procedures to be employed in its use, which plaintiff claims as its trade secret.
Id.
196. Id. at 530.
197. Id.
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recognized that the user interface is an important design element for the
organization of a computer program.'98
Since recent cases have extended copyright protection to the structure and
organization of computer programs, courts should extend copyright protec-
tion to the user interface because the user interface is an important element
of authorship incorporated in the structure and organization of a computer
program.' The same idea-expression principles would apply to the user in-
terface as in other aspects of nonliteral copying. 00 Copyright law should not
protect those elements of the user interface that are inherent in the idea of
the program. 0 ' Copyright law, however, should protect those elements of the
user interface that reflect a programmer's design decisions in creating the par-
ticular expression of an idea.1°2
The copyright protection of traditional literary works supports the
Whelan, SAS, Williams, and Johnson courts' decisions to extend the copy-
right protection beyond the literal expression in computer programs.203 Judge
Learned Hand, when enunciating his celebrated "abstractions test," estab-
lished that the protection of more than the literal text is essential to protect
literary property.0 " In his abstractions test, Learned Hand suggested that
when a plagiarist does not copy a work verbatim, but copies an abstract of
the entire work, the determination of when the plagiarist has appropriated
the work is more difficult. 2" Judge Hand suggests that literary works fit into
an increasing number of patterns of greater generality as one extracts more
of the details from a particular work.20 6 At some point in the levels of
abstraction, the idea and the expression of the idea will become inseparable. 20 7
At this level of abstraction, copyright will not protect duplication of the
work.200 Judge Hand and other commentators have recognized that limiting
protection to the literal text of a work would vitiate the economic motivations
underlying copyright law.20 9 Commentators have noted that copyright law
198. Id.; see supra note 195 and accompanying text (discussing that major groupings in pro-
gram's menu can determine program's organization).
199. See supra notes 77-140, 164-67 and accompanying text (discussing cases recognizing
copyright protection for nonliteral elements of computer program).
200. See supra notes 35-45 and accompanying text (discussing idea-expression dichotomy
test for computer software).
201. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text-(discussing principle that copyright does
not protect expression which has merged with idea).
202. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text (copyright protects expression in
computer programs when expression is not only and essential means of achieving idea of
program).
203. See supra note 170 (discussing Johnson, SAS, Whelan, and Williams cases).
204. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F. 2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (effective
protection of literary works demands that copyright protect nonliteral copying of literary works).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1960).
208. Id.
209. Id.; 1 NIMMER, On Copyright § 1.10 of [B] at 1-72, -73 (1985); supra notes 13-15
and accompanying text (discussing policy of copyright law).
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should protect an author's particular selection, arrangement, and sequence
of ideas, as well as the author's literal text." '
In addressing the issue of nonliteral copying of traditional works, courts
also have held that copyright protection extends to the structure and orga-
nization of literary works that are analogous to computer programs such as
instruction manuals and textbooks".2 1 In Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row
Publishers, '2 for example, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York considered whether the copying of the selection and
organization of a text on child psychology constituted copyright infringe-
ment.' 3 The Meredith court found that although the defendant had added
some differing structure in creating the arrangement and selection of its
textbook, the structure and organization were primarily the result of the
defendant's copying of an outline made from plaintiff's textbook.22' Accord-
ingly, the Meredith court found that the defendant had infringed the copy-
right of the plaintiff's book. 2"'
Further support for the extension of copyright protection to the nonliteral
elements of a computer program is found in Orgel v. Clark Boardman Co.2' l
In Orgel, the Second Circuit noted that the appropriation of another's
creative and intellectual labors in publishing a competing work without
210. See NIMMER, supra note 209, at 1-73 to 1-74 (copyright law should protect author's
selection and arrangement of ideas); CHAFEE, Reflections On the Law of Copyright: I, 45 COLUM.
L. RaV. 503, 513-14 (1945) (copyright law should protect pattern of work and sequence of events
in work); Brief of Amicus Curiae at 22, Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.,
797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986) (copyright law should protect programmer's selection and arrange-
ment of ideas by extending protection to structure, sequence, pattern, and organization of com-
puter programs).
211. See Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686, 690
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 500 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1974); permanent injunction entered, 413 F. Supp.
385 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (finding defendant guilty of copyright infringement when defendant had
copied directly only small portion of plaintiff's textbook but had copied extensively structure
and topical sequence of plaintiff's work); see also Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d
119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (effective protection of literary works demands that copyright protect
literary works from nonliteral plagiarism); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d
49, 55 (2d Cir.) (person can appropriate expression in play without using play's dialogue), cert.
denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936).
212. Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686-690 (S.D.N.Y),
aff'd, 500 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1974); permanent injunction entered, 413 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
213. Meredith, 378 F. Supp. at 690.
214. Id. In Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row Publishers, Meredith Corporation (Meredith)
decided to publish a textbook on child psychology. Id. at 687. Meredith conducted a market
survey and determined that a textbook, authored by Drs. Mussen and Kagan, was a leading
book in the field. Id. Consequently, Meredith decided to use the Mussen book as a model for
the selection, weight, and sequencing of topics. Id. Meredith employees prepared detailed outlines
of the chapters in the Mussen book and distributed the outlines to freelance writers to prepare
the text of Meredith's textbook. Id. The freelance writers that Meredith employed often had
no background in psychology. Id.
215. Id. at 690. The court in Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row Publishers noted that a
scholar like Dr. Mussen, who coauthored the textbook published by Harper & Row Publishers,
Inc., would have no incentive to do the years of research and scholarship necessary to create
such a textbook when others could merely paraphrase Dr. Mussen's work and compete with
him. Id.
216. 301 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 817 (1962).
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expending the same time and effort necessary to create independently the
same result is a copyright infringement." 7 The copying of the structure and
organization of computer programs, as the SAS court clearly articulated, con-
stitutes the appropriation of significant creative and intellectual labors.2 ' If
copyright law did not protect the structure and organization of computer pro-
grams, competitors of a software developer would receive a windfall by sav-
ing substantial resources in developing a successful structure and organization
for rival programs.219 Consequently, the failure of copyright law to protect
these elements of a program would vitiate software developers' monetary in-
centives, which copyright law strives to protect."'
Following the lead of the Whelan, SAS, Johnson and Williams courts, 2'
the federal judiciary should continue to expand the scope of protection for
computer programs to encompass programs' user interface, structure,
and organization, and thereby promote Congress' desire to foster creative
and intellectual achievements in computer programming through the copy-
rights laws.222 The judicial extension of copyright protection to these elements
of computer programs is consistent with the historical application of copyright
law to new technologies. 2 3 Just as Congress recognized the need to protect
the valuable rights in motion pictures and sound recordings, courts also
should extend copyright protection to encompass the valuable rights in the user
interface, structure, and organization of computer programs.24 Because copy-
right law classifies computer programs as literary works, the copyright pro-
tection of the structure and organization in traditional literary works like-
wise compels the protection of these elements in computer programs.22 1 In
217. Id. at 120.
218. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., 605 F. Supp. 816, 826 (M.D. Tenn.
1985) (appropriation of completed and proven design of computer program saves competitors
substantial time and effort in developing original design); supra notes 62-71 and accompanying
text (discussing importance of structure and organization in development of computer programs).
219. SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., 605 F. Supp. 816, 826 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
220. See Brief of Amicus Curiae at 6, Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797
F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986) (limiting copyright protection to literal text would inhibit dissemination of
new programs to detriment of society and computer industry); supra note 10 and accompanying
text (discussing how copyright law protects programmers' monetary incentives to promote
creation of new programs).
221. See supra note 168 (discussing Johnson, SAS, Whelan and Williams cases).
222. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1254 (3d Cir.
1983) ('80 amendments to '76 Act reflect Congress' receptivity to new technology and Congress'
desire to foster, through copyright laws, continued creativity and imagination in computer software),
cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text (discussing
policy of copyright law).
223. See supra note 16 (discussing historical application of copyright law to new technol-
ogies).
224. See supra note 16 (discussing extension of copyright law to protect valuable rights in
motion pictures and sound recordings).
225. See supra note 22 (discussing classification of computer programs as literary works
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determining whether to extend protection to the structure and organiza-
tion in a particular program, courts must balance the need for protec-
tion of the programmer's creative labors with society's need for the free
dissemination of ideas. 2 , Whenever a copyrighted program consists of
protectible expression, so that other programmers are able to create a
computer program that performs the same function as the copyrighted
program through the independent creation of the structure, organization, and
user interface, courts should protect the copyright owner's valuable interests
in these elements of the program.
DANIEL J. FETTERMAN
under copyright law); supra notes 203-15 and accompanying text (discussing copyright protection
of nonliteral elements in traditional literary works).
226. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text (explaining fundamental policy of
copyright law as balance between encouraging creation of new works by protecting author's
economic incentives and protecting society's interest in free dissemination of ideas).
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